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ABSTRACT 
No existing finance literature focuses on the predictability of average 
stock retum in the tourism industry, though it has become an important 
part of world economy. The major objective of this paper is to examine 
whether the short-term price momentum and long-term reversal effect 
of tourism stocks in U.S from 1973 to 2008 exist. Another purpose of 
the study is to find out what is the main cause that makes the decline of 
stock retums in the last two decades. 
By adopting three different trading methods, this study finds that 
momentum effect for the tourism stocks is much more significant than 
the general U.S. stock market. Besides, self-financing portfolio of 
tourism industry is more profitable than the general market regardless 
the trading methods used. The evidence of the study shows that the 
Fama-French three-factor model can only explain part of the 
momentum and reversal effect. The study tends to support price 
overreaction and the correction hypothesis, as the evidence shows that 
the movements in portfolio retums come by changes in retum on assets 
(ROAs). 
This study also finds that portfolio retums ofthe first subsample period, 
1973-1990, are always larger than corresponding portfolio retums of the 
second subsample period, 1991-2008. However, such phenomenon is 
not shown in the general stock market. This change coincides with a 
substantial increase in institutional holdings in hospitality stocks in the 
1990s. I propose that the increase of institutional ownership in tourism 



























First and foremost, I would like to show my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, 
Professor Leung Wai Kin, for encouraging my studies, and for providing me with 
direction and support through all difficult stages to complete this thesis which could not 
have been possible without the sage advice of him. Since the beginning of my 
sophomore year of undergraduate study, he has been a kind mentor and a good model 
for my development. His help and warm encouragement has enabled me to surmount 
the obstacles during the past years. His inspiration and suggestions on many of my 
academic and extracurricular activities have rendered me into a more mature person. 
I'm also extremely grateful to Professor Tse Eliza Ching-Yick, whose patient and 
meticulous guidance and invaluable suggestions are indispensable to the completion of 
this thesis. What's more, I would like to thank Professor Zhou Yinggang for his 
priceless comments on this study. 
I wish to extend my thanks to the School of Hotel and Tourism Mangement, for 
their support of my study. I owe special thanks to Professor Lee Kam-Hom, a 
respectable, responsible and resourceful scholar, who has provided me with valuable 
guidance ever since my first-year undergraduate study in CUHK. 
What's more, I would like to thank my friends and team members from 
Postgraduate Hall Residents Associations 09-10，CUHK Postgraduate Association 
09-10 and Xuesi Hall in New Asia College. Without them, my postgraduate life would 
not be that colorful and exciting. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my family for their support all the way from 
the very beginning of my postgraduate study. I am thankful to all my family members 
for their thoughtfulness and encouragement. 
iii 
Table of Content 
參 
Abstract i 
m ^ ii 
•參• 
Acknowledgement 且！且 
Table ofContent iv 
List ofTables vi 
List ofFigures vii 
Chapter 1： Introduction 1 
1.1 An Overview of the Tourism Industry 1 
1.2 Research Motivation 3 
1.3 Outline 8 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 9 
Chapter 3： The Data and Methodology 14 
3.1 Dataset 14 
3.2 Methodology 21 
Chapter 4: Empirical Evidence For Tourism Industry 25 
4.1 Hypothesis 26 
4.2 Evidence for the tourism stocks 27 
4.3 Decomposition of Retums 42 
4.4 Seasonality 52 
Chapter 5： Empirical Evidence For The Market 56 
5.1 Momentum and reversal effect in general market 57 
5.1.1 Profitability and Return Performance 5 7 
5.1.2 Seasonality 66 
5.2 Tourism industry vs. General market 70 
iv 
Chapter 6： Explaining The Momentum And Reversal Effect: Capital 
Asset Pricing Model 73 
6.1 Capmand three-factor model 74 
6.2 Evidence from tourism stocks 86 
Chapter 7： Explaining The Momentum And Reversal Effect: 
Fundamentals 92 
7.1 Movements in fundamentals 95 
7.1.1 Fundamental hypothesis 95 
7.11 Movement in profits 96 
7.2 Using Logit Model To Explore Differences Between The Winner 
And The Loser Portfolio 108 
7.2.1 Induction of a binary choice approach- logit regression 
model 108 
7.2.2 MODEL I: Using changes in ROA 113 
7.2.3 MODEL II: Using coded Ret_ROA 115 
7.2.4 MODEL III: Multi-variable logistic regression 118 
Chapter 8: The Price Impact Of Institutional Investors To Tourism 
Stocks 120 
8.1 Changes of institutional ownership in tourism stocks 122 
8.2 Regression Results 126 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 132 
Reference 138 
V 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics of Market Sample 16 
Table 3.2 Summary Statistics of Tourism Sample 19 
Table 4.1 Returns of Strategy JT 30 
Table 4.2 Returns of Strategy GHH 35 
Table 4.3 Returns of Strategy GHL 39 
Table 4.4 Different Strategies of JTApproach 44 
Table 4.5 Different Strategies of GHH Approach 47 
Table 4.6 Different Strategies of GHL Approach 50 
Table 4.7 Seasonality in Momentum Profits 54 
Table 5.1 Results for the General Stock Market 61 
Table 5.2 Seasonality for the General Stock Market 68 
Table 6.1 Three-Factor Regressions for Monthly Excess Returns (in Percent) 
of Portfolios 90 
Table 8.1 Institutional Percentages for Tourism Stocks 124 
Table 8.2 Regression Results 129 
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 4.1 Changes of Average Monthly Return of Portfolios Formed in 
Strategy JT 32 
Figure 4.2 Changes of Average Monthly Return of Portfolios Formed in 
Strategy GHH 37 
Figure 4.3 Changes of Average Monthly Return of Portfolios Formed in 
Strategy GHL 41 
Figure 5.1 Changes of Monthly Return of Portfolios Formed in Strategy JT for 
General Stock Market 63 
Figure 5.2 Changes of Monthly Return of Portfolios Formed in Strategy GHH 
for General Stock Market 64 
Figure 5.3 Changes of Monthly Return of Portfolios Formed in Strategy GHL 
for General Stock Market 65 
Figure6.1 CAPM Model 76 
Figure 7.1 Changes in ROAs for Strategy JT 101 
Figure 7.2 Changes in ROAs for Strategy GHH 103 




Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with 
the recognition that nature has somehow violated the 
paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science. 
(Thomas Kuhn) 
In his best known and most influential work Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas 
Kuhn described how science progresses. After the birth of a central paradigm, 
researches are conducted to enlarge the central paradigm by "puzzle-solving". The 
failure of a result to validate the paradigm is deemed not as the fault of the paradigm, 
but as the mistake committed by the researcher. If more and more anomalous evidences 
arise, a new paradigm, which could subsume the old results along with the anomalous 
results into one framework, has to be found. The process of searching for this new 
paradigm is at the heart o fa scientific revolution, and it is essential to the research work 
introduced in this thesis: A Study of the Price Momentum and Reversal Effect ofTourism 
Stocks in the United States. 
1.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE TOURISM INDUSTRY 
As defined by the World Tourism Organization, the tourists are people who "travel 
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to and stay in places outside their usual environment for more than twenty-four hours 
and not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business and other purposes not 
related to the exercise of an activity remunerated from within the place visited". 
Tourism is businesses that provide goods and services to tourists, and involves any 
activity that causes a tourist to incur an expenditure on his or her trip. It is an industry 
comprising thousands of component businesses, including hospitality services - hotel, 
boarding houses, restaurants; transport systems — airlines, railroads, cruise lines, rental 
car agencies, and related services such as banking, insurance and safety & security. 
According to the 2010 Research Report ofWorld Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), 
the tourism industry is one of the world's largest industries. In 2009，the travel & 
tourism economy industry contributed 9.6% or US$5.43 trillion to the world Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), and its direct contribution is US$1.88 trillion or 3.2% ofthe 
world's total GDP. In the past ten years, the world tourism industry grew almost twice 
as fast as the world's overall GNP. The contribution is expected to rise from estimated 
US$5.76 trillion (9.2%) in 2010 to US$11.51 trillion (9.6%) by 2020. Over 235 million 
employments (8.2% oftotal) are provided in the industry in 2009, and it is expected to 
rise to over 303 million (9.2% oftotal) by 2020 (WTTC TSAResearch Report, 2010). 
The tourism industry also has some unique characteristics that would make the 
study interesting. First, the tourism industry is a cash rich industry. Most of the 
operations in the industry receive cash on a daily basis and collection ofdebt tends to be 
a less serious problem. Second, some of the sub-sectors, like the airline, hotel and 
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amusement park sectors take a substantial period of time to complete the building of 
new facilities. Third, the tourism industry is selling non-essential goods and services. 
When economy is good, people tend to have more income and they will consume more 
of the non-essential goods and services, such as eating out more and taking to more 
vacations. When the economy tums sour, people will cut the consumption of 
non-essential goods and services first. This implies that the business cycle will have a 
much bigger impact on this industry than other industries. Leung and Lee (2006) 
documents that tourism stocks are more volatile than the general stock market 
regardless ofwhether stock retum is calculated on daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly or 
annual basis between 1981 and 1999. 
1.2 RESEARCH MOTWATION 
During the research work on tourism stocks, I have been aware of one ofthe most 
important central paradigms in financial economics is that markets are efficient. Under 
the assumption of market efficiency, stock prices should reflect all available 
information at a certain point in time. Thus, it should be impossible to predict future 
stock returns based on its historical returns. Researches on whether stock prices are 
predictable can date back to studies of Louis Bachelier who first expressed 
efficient-market hypothesis in his 1900 dissertation, "The Theory of Speculation". In 
the early 1900s, a small number of studies, such as Cowles and Jones (1937), indicated 
that US stock prices and related financial series followed a random walk model. 
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According to Cowles's work, professional investors were in general unable to 
outperform the market by consistently achieving returns in excess of average market 
returns. Later, Fama (1970) developed the efficient-market hypothesis. Until 1970 
researches indicated that no intertemporal dependence could be observed and Fama 
interpreted the fact as evidence for capital market efficiency. However, by 1991, 
empirical researches have consistently found problems with the efficient-market 
hypothesis, such as it has been found that stocks with low price to earnings outperform 
other stocks. The unexpected accumulation of anomalous evidences indicates that to 
some extent stock retums seems to be predictable. 
In recent researches of intertemporal dependence in the cross section of stock 
prices, the winner-loser effect which is first document by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) 
caught more and more attention. The winner-loser effect depicts a phenomenon that 
stocks which have higher long-term (three- to five-year) past retums (the "winner" 
stocks) tend to underperform stocks which have lower past retums (the “loser” stocks) 
in the future. Normally, such reversal effect can be observed within a period o f 3 � 5 year. 
Later, Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) found momentum effect. Unlike the previous 
winner-loser effect, the momentum effect describes the situation that former winner 
firms continuously perform better than the former loser firms in the short-term 
(normally no more than 12 months). In recent year, George and Hwang (2004) also find 
that past winners in terms of past price levels can also outperform past losers in the 
short and mid-term. The above findings indicate that past stock returns can be used to 
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predict future stock returns. If current stock prices do not reflect all available 
information, the hypothesis ofmarket efficiency seems to be violated. The old paradigm 
ofmarket efficiency is challenged. 
Thus whether we need a new paradigm to explain the winner-loser effect? 
According to Kuhn (1970) three ways are available to react to an anomaly which cannot 
be explained by the ruling paradigm. Firstly, science "ultimately proves able to handle 
the crisis-provoking problem". Then no new paradigm is needed as the problem can be 
solved within the old framework. Secondly, even "radical new approaches" fail to 
explain the anomaly. Then it is left to a "future generation with more developed tools". 
Finally, the third possible reaction is that the crisis ends with "a new candidate for 
paradigm and with the ensuing battle over its acceptance". 
Thus, following the line of Kuhn, the first explanation I explore is whether the 
winner-loser effect can be explained within the framework of market efficiency. 
Although at first sight, the winner-loser effect seems to contradict market efficiency, 
closer inspection reveals the following. The winner-loser effect does not contradict 
market efficiency as long as the difference in retums between the winner and the loser 
portfolio is expected. To test whether this is the case, it is necessary to identify a model 
according to which expectation are built. 
The model I use to investigate the winner-loser effect is the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM). The CAPM can be derived from the general asset pricing model under 
further restrictive assumptions. According to this model high expected retums are due to 
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a high exposure to systematic risk. Small expected retums are due to a small exposure. 
For the winner-loser effect this implies that the difference in the performance between 
the winner and the loser portfolio is due to a difference in the exposure to systematic 
risk. If conditional on past performance the loser portfolio performs better than the 
winner portfolio, the loser portfolio must have a higher exposure to systematic risk. In 
the CAPM the exposure to systematic risk is measured by Beta, which is the covariance 
ofindividual stock retum with the market return. 
Though CAPM is the most famous theory in asset pricing model, it fails usually in 
practice. In order to rescue the CAPM and the market efficiency theory, Fama and 
French (1993) proposed the three-factor model. This model incorporates two more 
explanatory variables, the size and market variables, along with the market variable. 
According to Fama and French, these variables mimic the systematic risks which are 
not captured by the market yet influence the cross-section differences of stock retums. 
By adopting this model, Fama and French (1996) argue that most of the anomalies can 
be resolved by it. Thus, in my investigation, I also follow their step to test whether the 
winner-loser effect can be explained by the three-factor model, if CAPM are not 
sufficient to explain the winner-loser effect. 
From my investigation of U.S. tourism stocks, it tums out that within the CAPM 
and three-factor model only part ofthe winner-loser effect can be explained. Although 
the three-factor model can largely explain some of the reversal effect, it cannot explain 
the momentum effect. Therefore, the question arises whether a new paradigm is 
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available which can explain the winner-loser effect better. 
In recent years, scholars offinancial behavior give out an alternative explanation of 
the winner-loser effect that the observed retum momentum and reversals are due to 
irrational behavior of market participants. This proposition has already been made by 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985). The authors interpreted their findings as evidence of an 
overreaction to news announcements. When positive news is incorporated into stock 
prices, investors become too optimistic. In the same way negative news induces 
investors to become too pessimistic. This causes persistence in short-term retums. After 
longer time horizons investors realize that they have been mislead and readjust stock 
prices to their fundamental values. This causes long-term reversal in stock retums. 
One possible way to explore the pattem of news announcements is to relate the 
pattem of stock retums to movements in fundamentals such as profits and dividends. 
The pattem ofnews announcements for the winner portfolio should be as follows. After 
a period of positive news investors become too optimistic. Afterwards investors are 
disappointed due to a series ofunexpected negative news. If these news are reflected in 
profits, a period of increases in profits should be followed by a period ofdecreases. The 
reverse pattem should obtain for the loser portfolio. A period of negative news 
announcements is followed by a period of positive news announcements. A period of 
decreases in profits should be followed by a period of profit improvements. This is the 
second explanation which I pursue in this monograph. 
For my study ofU.S. tourism stocks, the above mentioned pattem in fundamentals 
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can indeed be observed. For the winner-lower effect the pattem of portfolio returns is 
paralleled by changes in fundamentals. These findings support the new paradigm of 
irrational behavior of market participants. 
During my research on momentum and reversal effects in tourism stocks, I also 
record a significant retum difference between the period 1973-1990 and the period 
1991-2008. By studying the changes of institutional ownership of tourism stocks during 
the same periods, I propose the increment of institutional ownership may account a 
portion to the drift of period returns. 
1.3 OUTLINE 
The rest ofthe study is proceeding as follows. In chapter 2,1 review past literature 
about momentum and reversal effects existing in stock markets. Chapter 3 depicts the 
data sets and methodology I use to conduct further investigations. Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 present results from the tourism stocks and the general stock market 
respectively in terms of momentum and reversal effects, seasonality and properties of 
loser and winner portfolios. Chapter 6 explains the recorded momentum and reversal 
effects in the framework ofrational asset pricing. Chapter 7 interprets the phenomena as 
investor overreaction to fundamentals news and proposes a binary choice approach-a 
logit model to study the relationship between fundamentals and portfolio classification. 
Chapter 8 investigates the difference in tourism stock retums between two subsample 




Topics on short-term price momentum and long-term price reversals have been widely 
discussed in the literature. DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and Chopra, Lakonishok, 
and Ritter (1992) document that there are price reversals over three to five year horizons, 
where former losers outperform former winners. Then, if implemented properly 
according to such time horizon, a contrarian strategy ofbuying former losers and selling 
former winners are profitable. On the other hand, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) 
show that over a medium-term ofthree to twelve month there exists momentum effects 
that stocks performing superiorly in the previous year continue to eam higher retums 
than stocks performing poorly over the same period. Thus, a momentum strategy of 
buying former winners and selling former losers can be found profitable. 
Though earliest findings are based on the investigation of U.S stock markets, 
mounted evidences show that effects of price momentum and reversal are pervasive in a 
global scope. Rouwenhorst (1998, 1999) document momentum effects existing in 
twelve European countries and emerging markets. By implementing momentum 
strategies in eight Asian markets, Chui, Titman, and Wei (2000) find that momentum 
effect exist in these markets. Using the stock index data in 23 countries Chan, Hameed 
and Tong (2000) not only show that momentum strategies are profitable, but also find 
that momentum profits arise mainly from the stock markets rather than the currency 
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markets. 
As the topic of price momentum and reversal attract more and more attention, a 
large body of in-depth evidences emerges. To an industry level, Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999) reports momentum effect in industry components of stock returns. 
They find that momentum strategies are less profitable if the industry momentum effect 
is controlled. On the other hand, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find that industry 
adjustment only can explain 20 percent of price momentum effect. Considering factors, 
such as transaction costs and trading volume, studies by Fama and French (1988), 
Zarowin (1990), and Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) find that reversals are 
greatest in small stocks, while Ball, Kothari, and Shanken (1995) show that reversals 
mainly occur in slow priced stocks. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) demonstrates that past 
trading volume can predict both the magnitude and persistence of future price 
momentum by showing that the price momentum of low-volume stocks is generally 
smaller than large-volume stocks and the retum differential between past winners and 
past lowers is wider for high-volume firms. In addition, George and Hwang (2004) find 
thatprice level can also be used to predict the future price retum by showing that stocks 
with last price closest to the highest price in the previous 52 weeks outperform other 
stocks in the short to medium-term period. 
Though the existences of momentum and reversal effect have been confirmed by 
the pervious literature, what causes momentum and reversal is still a matter of debate. 
Fama and French (1996), proponents of rational asset pricing model, claim that most of 
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pricing anomalies, including the long-term price reversal, can be explained by the 
three-factor model successfully. However such model fails to explain the short-term 
momentum effect. Conrad and Kaul (1998) argue that the cross-sectional variation in 
expected retums rather than predictable time-series variations in stock retums account 
for the profitability of momentum strategies and imply that the profit of momentum 
strategies should maintain in a same level during the postranking period. This assertion 
is then rejected by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) by showing that the profits of 
momentum strategies decrease in the postranking period. 
From the failure of Fama & French's three-factor model, it seems that within the 
framework of rational asset pricing, one cannot accommodate both the short-term price 
momentum and long-term price reversal. Thus, in order to explain how investors might 
form beliefs that lead to price momentum and reversal simultaneously, scholars of 
financial behavior tell their stories of irrational investing behavior and build on their 
models based on behavioral study. 
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) build up a learning model by assuming that 
actual earnings follow a random walk, while individuals wrongly believe that earnings 
either follow a steady "trends" or are "mean reversions". Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) assume that overconfidence leads to negative long-run 
autocorrelations while biased self-attribution results in positive short-run 
autocorrelations. Hong and Stein (1999) assume that a market consists ofnews watchers, 
and momentum traders. Since information diffuses gradually, prices underreact in the 
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short-run. The naive trading based on past price trends by momentum traders push 
prices ofpast winners above their fundamental values. When prices eventually revert to 
their fundamentals, trades by investors will finally lead to overreaction at long horizons. 
Some literature presents result consisting with the predictions of those behavioral 
models. For example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Chan, Jegadeesh, and 
Lakonishok (1996) provide corroborating evidence by showing that stock prices 
underreact to news announcement. Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) show that the 
underreaction is consistent with the gradual diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999), 
where the information diffuses only gradually across the investing public. They find that 
momentum strategies tend to work better for stocks with low analyst coverage. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) showed that while there are profits to momentum-sorted 
portfolios at the initial stage of implementation, the profits decline over time and are 
eventually reversed. Their results are consistent with the predictions of some behavioral 
models (like Daniel et. al., 1998) that delayed reactions will lead to price momentum, 
which finally pushes the prices away from the equilibrium values. 
Finance literature discussed above basically studies the general market and does not 
focus on any economic sector. It would be interesting to study whether this important 
financial phenomenon occurs in the tourism industry. The tourism industry itself has 
some unique characteristics that would make the study interesting. First, the tourism 
industry is a cash rich industry. Most of the operations in the industry receive cash on a 
daily basis and collection of debt tends to be a less serious problem. Second, some of 
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the sub-sectors, like the airlines, hotel and amusement park sectors take a substantial 
period oftime to complete the building ofnew facilities. Third, the tourism industry is 
selling non-essential goods and services. When economy is good, people tend to have 
more income and they will consume more of the non-essential goods and services, such 
as eating out more and taking to more vacations. When the economy turns sour, people 
will cut the consumption of non-essential goods and services first. This implies that the 
business cycle will have a much bigger impact on this industry than other industries. 
Leung and Lee (2006) document that tourism stocks are more volatile than the general 
stock market no matter how stock retum is calculated, on daily, weekly, monthly, 
quarterly or annually between 1981 and 1999. Would this characteristic make the 
tourism industry more likely to have overreactions in its stock retum? In the following 
chapters, we will focus our study on the retum behavior oftourism stocks. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE DATAAND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 DATASET 
In the following chapters, I will investigate momentum and reversal effects of stock 
retums within the scope ofU.S. tourism stocks as well as the general U.S. stock market. 
Therefore, I construct two samples: one is for the tourism stocks and the other one is for 
the overall stock markets. 
The sample ofoverall stock market, which is called the market sample in the rest of 
the study, consists of all firms in the intersection of (a) the NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ return files from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and (b) 
the merged COMPUSTAT annual files of fundamental accounting data, provided by 
Standard & Poor's. To be included in the sample, a firm must have COMPUSTAT 
values on book equity (BE), assets (A), earnings (E), cash flows (CF) and sales (S). To 
ensure that accounting variables are known before the retums (thus to avoid the 
so-called look-ahead bias), I match the accounting data for all fiscal yearends in 
calendar year t-1 with the retums for July ofyear t to June of t+l. Earlier work, such as 
Basu (1983), shows that accounting data are not immediately available to public right 
after the fiscal yearends, and would be available 3 to 4 months -month after the fiscal 
yearends. According to Fama and French (1992), the minimum 6-month gap between 
the fiscal yearend and the tested retum is conservative. Thus, to be included in the 
14 
sample, a firm must have COMPUSTAT values for the preceding year. 
The CRSP daily and monthly tape provided daily closing prices, stock returns, 
shares outstanding, as well as stock indices data. Using these data, basic information, 
such as stock cumulative retums, market capitalization (ME, stock price times shares 
outstanding) are derived. When calculating a firm's book-to-market value (BE/ME) in 
year t, I use the firm's market equity at the end ofDecember of year t - 1. To measure a 
firm's size, I use its market equity for June of year t. Therefore, to be included in later 
investigation, a firm must have a CRSP stock price for December of year t-l and June of 
year t. Besides, to facilitate for estimation of Beta, a firm must also have monthly 
retums for at least 24 months preceding July of year t. The sample period is from 1973 
to 2008. The reason I choose the year 1973 as the starting year is that records of 
NASDAQ begin to be available on CRSP ever since this year. Some summary statistics 
of the market sample are present in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 shows that the total number of firms listed in stock markets was 
increasing in most of the years during 1980s and 1990s. Starting from 1999 the firm 
number decreased in each year of 2000s. The change of total firm number is a good 
indicator of economic and business condition that the increase of firm number in 1990s 
reflects the market boom in the same period and the decrease in 2000s indicated the 
economic regression suffered in recent years. Besides, the company sizes, as measured 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The sample oftourism stocks, which is called the tourism sample in the rest ofthe 
study, is a subsample of the market sample. This sample consists of firms from four 
tourism related industry groups based on Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
system. The industry groups are 451: Scheduled Air Transportation, 581: Eating and 
Drinking Places, 701: Hotels and Motels, and 799: Miscellaneous Amusement and 
Recreation. Table 3.2 is a description of the sample. The sample period is from 1973 to 
2008. 
Table 3.2 shows that the sector of Eating and Drinking places takes the largest 
portion in total tourism stocks. Though the firm number of Amusement and Recreation 
sector is the lowest among the four sectors during 1973 to 1990, it increase and exceed 
the one of Hotel sector in the second-half period, 1991 to 2008. The total number of 
tourism stocks was also increasing largely during 1980s and 1990s, yet is decreasing 
ever since the year of 1999. This phenomenon corresponds to what happens in total firm 
number ofthe general stock market, showing that the tourism industry is very sensitive 
to the overall market environment. Also, it is interesting that all the mean values offirm 
size are much greater than the median values no matter which tourism sector a company 
in. This finding show that the distribution of firm size in tourism industry is highly 
skewed to right as large firms with titanic market capitalizations pulls the mean of the 
whole sector for a much higher value. For the book-to-market values, the difference 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Starting point for my analysis of momentum and reversal effect in stock retums is 
the work DeBondt and Thaler (1985)，where winner-loser effect has first been 
mentioned. As the testing period is quite long, from 1926 to 1982, DeBondt and Thaler 
use non-overlapping samples to conduct their research. As I do not have data of time 
horizon ofthat long, I consider methodology using overlapping samples. However, from 
an econometric point ofview, the use of overlapping samples is a problem. According to 
Hansen and Hodrick (1980), the overlapping of observations creates a moving average 
(MA) error term and thus ordinary least squares (OLS) parameter estimates would be 
inefficient and hypothesis tests biased. In the work Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the 
authors adopt an initiative method which uses overlapping samples, yet avoids problems 
brought by using overlapping data. In their approach，though overlapping data are used 
to construct stock portfolios, they use the average current-one-month retum of stocks in 
portfolio, which are independent to each other, to test the results, (detailed approach is 
discussed in the following text) 
As the method of Jegadeesh and Titman obtains great advantages, this method has 
been extensively used in recent studies on stock price momentum effect. George and 
Hwang (2004) also adopt the method of this method. However, instead of using 
cumulative past performance of stock retums to form the portfolios, they construct stock 
portfolios based on price level of stocks. Though adopting different variables to 
construct their portfolios, both papers recorded significant price momentum effect in 
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stock market. 
For my study, I follow their methods to investigate the cross section of tourism 
stock retums and the whole U.S. stock market with a sample period from 1973 to 2008. 
In the rest ofthis section, I describe the methods of portfolio construction in details. 
1. Investment Strategies formed based on Cumulative Past Returns 
The first strategy is constructed based on the method of Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993), therefore I name it Strategy JT after the name of the authors. For this trading 
strategy, past performance is measured as the cumulative retums ofprevious months. 
At the beginning of each month t, all securities in the sample are ranked in 
ascending order on the basis oftheir continuously compounded retums in the past J 
months. Based on these rankings, three equal-weighted portfolios are constructed. 
Stock ranked in the top 33% ofpast retums constitute the winner portfolio, stock in 
the bottom 33% constitute the loser portfolio, and the remaining stocks constitute 
the middle portfolio. The strategy is to hold, for K months, a self-fmancing portfolio 
by longing the winner portfolio and shorting the loser portfolio. In each month t o fa 
(J,K) strategy, the return to winners is calculated as the equally weighted average of 
the month-t retums from K individual winner portfolios, each generated in one of 
the K consecutive pervious months t-l-K to t. The month-t retum of losers is done in 
the same way. The retum ofthe overall strategy in month t is the difference between 
the month-t retum to winners and the month-t retum to losers. Take a JT(6,6) 
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strategy for example, at the beginning ofJanuary 1980, all stocks in the sample are 
allocated to 3 portfolios based on their continuously compounded retums for July 
1979 through December 1979. The strategy longs the top 33% stocks and shorts the 
bottom 33% stocks, and keeps this position for 6 months. The monthly retum ofthe 
strategy in January 1980 is the equally weighted average of retums from 6 separate 
self-financing strategies formed consecutively from August 1979 to January 1980. 
2. Investment Strategies based on Price Level 
The second and third investment strategies are formed based on the method 
mentioned in George and Hwang (2004). Rather than using compounded past 
retums as a ranking criterion, this method uses price level to rank the stocks. The 
price level is measured by 尸如 or 产一‘，where P,>i is the price of stock i at ^ higki,t-i iowi^t-i 
the end of month t-l and highi，t-i(hwi,t-i) is the highest (lowest) price of stock i 
achieved during the previous K-month period that ends on the last day of moth t-l . 
Except for the difference in ranking criterion, monthly retums of price level strategy 
are obtained i n a similar way. In the rest of the paper, I call this method Strategy 
GHH ifhighi,t-i is used or Strategy GHL if /oWi,t-i is used. Take a GHH(6,6) strategy 
for example, at the beginning ofJanuary 1980, all stocks in the sample are allocated 
to 3 portfolios based on the ratios of last price for the previous month to the highest 
price they achieved over July 1979 to December 1979. The strategy longs the top 33% 
stocks and shorts the bottom 33% stocks, and keeps this position for 6 months. The 
23 
monthly retum ofthe strategy in January 1980 is the equally weighted average of 
retums from 6 separate self-financing strategies formed consecutively from August 
1979 to January 1980. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR TOURISM INDUSTRY 
In this chapter, I present results of my investigation on momentum and reversal 
effects in tourism stocks. I explore those anomalous phenomena by using three different 
trading strategies: strategy JT, GHH and GHL. In strategy JT portfolios are formed 
based on cumulative compounded previous retums, where portfolio sell contains the 
losers stocks with the lowest ranking period retums, portfolio buy the winner stocks 
with the highest ranking period retums, and portfolio middle the remaining stocks. 
Portfolios of strategy GHH(L) are formed based on ratios of the last price of formation 
period divided by the highest(lowest) price achieved in the formation period. Among 
those portfolios, portfolio sell is comprised of loser stocks with the lowest ratios, 
portfolio buy winner stocks with the highest ratios, and portfolio middle the remaining 
stocks. Details ofthose strategies have been described in the previous chapter. Though 
the three ranking criterion are calculated in different ways, they all related to past price 
performance of stocks. In stock market, historical price performance is a major source 
of information to public, based on which investors can build up their expectation. Thus, 
if those trading strategies behave similarly to some extends, we may exert information 
about investors' expectation towards historical price performance. In the rest of this 
chapter, I compare the three trading strategies from four perspectives: profitability, 
pattem of profitability, seasonality and properties of portfolios. Before we proceed, I 
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introduce some hypotheses related to momentum and reversal effects. 
4.1 HYPOTHESIS 
Previous literature, such as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993 & 2001), documents the 
evidence that stock retums exhibit significant momentum effect in a short to 
midum-term holding period (normally less than 12 months) and then a price reversal 
phenomenon is followed by. In this section I investigate the following two hypotheses. 
First, I test whether the winner portfolio performs better than the loser portfolio after the 
formation of portfolios, RL <Rw, where Rw denotes the retum on the winner portfolio 
during the holding period and RLdenotes the retum on the loser portfolio. Ifthis is the 
case then a profitable momentum trading strategy is available: A long position in the 
winner portfolio which is financed by a short position in the loser portfolio should eam 
a positive retum on average. Second, I test whether price momentum is followed by a 
price reversal that winner portfolio performs worse than the loser portfolio, Rw<RL. In 
this case, a contrarian strategy, where the purchase of the loser portfolio is financed by 
short selling of the winner portfolio, is profitable. The two hypotheses can be 
summarized as follows. 
Short-term Momentum Hypothesis 




Long-term Reversal Hypothesis 
Former winner firms perform worse than former loser firms after the momentum effect. 
Rw<RL 
4.2 EVIDENCE FOR THE TOURISM STOCKS 
Table 4.1 presents average monthly retums of the different buy and sell portfolios 
as well as the self-financed, winners minus losers portfolio, for the 48 JT strategies 
formed based on cumulative compounded past retums. In panel A, the sample period is 
from 1973 to 2008. The retums ofall the self-financed portfolios are positive except for 
the JT(3,3) strategy, which is slightly negative. Most retums of momentum strategies 
with holding period less than 24 months are statistically significant. In past literature, 
scholars, such as Jegadeesh and Titman, recorded momentum effect persisting normally 
no longer than 12 months. In my investigation, regardless the formation period, 
momentum effects show longer persistence. Those significant positive retums during 
the period right after the formation of portfolios strongly support the momentum 
hypothesis mentioned in last section. Retums of portfolios with holding months more 
than 24 months are positive yet not statistically significant. The most successful 
self-financed strategy selects stocks based on their retums over the previous 12 months 
and then holds the portfolio for 3 months. This strategy yields 0.90% per months. Panel 
B and C are evidences from two subsample periods: 1973-1990 and 1991-2008. In the 
first subsample period, the results look similar to the one from the whole period. Most 
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retums of self-financed portfolios are positive. Regardless formation periods, most 
retums of strategies with holding period more than 24 months are not significant from 
zero. By and large, strategies with longer formation periods (J=9 and J=12) do better 
than strategies with shorter formation periods (J=3 and J=6). Panel C presents results for 
the second subsample period: 1991-2008. In this subsample, similar to the whole and 
the first subsample period, all the retums are positive. The values of the self-financed 
portfolios seem to be larger than their counterparts in the other sample periods, implying 
that momentum for this period is stronger, yet most of returns after 12 months are not 
very significant. From the table, we can also find that normally after 12-month the 
retums of the loser portfolios are increasing monotonically and retums of the winner 
portfolios are increasing. Most of the times, magnitudes of the increase of the loser 
portfolios is stronger than the one of the decrease of the winner portfolios. For example, 
in panel A, the loser portfolio in JT(12,3) strategy yields 0.58% and the winner portfolio 
1.48%. Their spread then diminishes as the holding length increases. The minimum 
difference is then gained when holding length achieves 60 months, where the retum of 
loser portfolio in a JT(12,60) strategies hit 1.09% and the retums of winner portfolio 
become 1.16%. Though there is no reversal effect, where retums of loser portfolios 
larger than the ones ofwinner portfolios, we recognize that monthly returns ofloser and 
winner portfolio become reversal to each other. Recall that, each winner or loser 
portfolio in JT strategy is comprised of K individual portfolios formed in previous 
months. Thus, the returns ofthose portfolios are average of several individual portfolios. 
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It is highly possible that the accumulated momentum retums of the later formed 
portfolios cover the reversal effect of the earliest formed portfolios to a large scale. 
Figure 4.1 presents graphical evidence for the momentum and reversal effect for a 
formation period of 12 months. As this figure shows monthly retums ofK-month (up to 
60 months) after formation, we can get better knowledge about the performance of 
individual winner and loser portfolio during the holding period. From this figure, we see 
that winner portfolio outperforms the loser portfolio in the first 22 months of the 
holding period, then loser portfolio dominate the winner portfolio in most of the rest 
holding periods. This evidence shows that there exists momentum and reversal effect in 
tourism stocks. Now we tum to other strategies to see whether such effects can be found 
by adopting other trading methods. 
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Table 4.1 Returns of Strategy JT 
This table reports the average monthly retums for portfolios formed based on J-month lagged retums and 
held for K months. The sell portfolio is the equally weighted portfolio of one-third o f the stocks with the 
lowest continuously compounded retums over the previous J months, and the buy portfolio is the equally 
weighted portfolio o f the one-third o f the stocks with the highest continuously compounded retums. The 
buy-sell portfolio is the zero-cost portfolio by longing the buy portfolio and shorting the sell portfolio. 
The t statistic is for the null hypothesis that the average monthly retums of the zero-cost portfolio are not 
significantly different from 0. Besides the whole sample period, January 1973 to December 1990, each 
panel also reports results for subperiods, January 1973 to December 1990 and January 1991 to December 
2008. 
PanelA. Results ofthe Whole Sample Period: 1973 - 2008 
J K= 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
" Y ^ ^ ~ ~ 0 ^ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ ^ " " ^ ^ ~ ~ a S ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ ^ " " ^ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ 0 . 9 5 
3 Buy 0.89 0.97 1.05 1.07 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
3 Buy-seU -0.06 0.21 0.34 0.40 0.24 0.28 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.05 
tstatistic -0.26 1.14 2.06** 2.74** 1.85* 2.33** 1.66 1.64 1.23 0.97 0.72 0.62 
6 SeU 0.74 0.63 0.55 0.58 0.71 0.73 0.82 0.84 0.88 0.90 0.94 0.95 
6 Buy 1.10 1.21 1.24 1.19 1.12 1.14 1.08 1.08 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.05 
6 Buy-seU 0.36 0.58 0.69 0.61 0.41 0.41 0.26 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.95 0.10 
tstatistic 1.48 2.59** 3.44** 3.26** 2.43** 2.69** 1.86* 1.83* 1.41 1.34 0.34 0.84 
9 SeU 0.64 0.51 0.56 0.64 0.72 0.75 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.92 0.96 0.98 
9Buy 1.37 1.40 1.35 1.29 1.22 1.20 1.15 1.13 1.10 1.11 1.10 1.09 
9 Buy-seU 0.73 0.89 0.79 0.65 0.50 0.44 0.32 0.27 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.11 
t statistic 2.87** 3.78** 3.57** 3.11** 2.66** 2.57** 1.98** 1.79* 1.43 1.34 1.03 0.82 
12 SeU 0.58 0.57 0.66 0.72 0.80 0.87 0.93 0.97 1.00 1.04 1.06 1.09 
12 Buy 1.48 1.44 1.40 1.36 1.30 1.27 1.23 1.20 1.19 1.19 1.17 1.16 
12 Buy-seU 0.90 0.87 0.75 0.64 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.07 
t statistic 3.5** 3.56** 3.18** 2.83** 2.46** 2.12** 1.72* 1.42 1.21 0.98 0.74 0.49 
“ Panel B. Results ofthe First-HatfSubsanple Period: 1973-1990 
J K= 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
3 SeU 1.36 1.11 1.00 0.96 1.05 1.04 1.08 1.10 1.15 1.17 1.19 1.20 
3 Buy 1.04 1.17 1.29 1.30 1.25 1.27 1.24 1.25 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 
3 Buy-seU -0.32 0.07 0.29 0.34 0.21 0.23 0.16 0.14 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02 
t statistic -1.14 0.29 1.42 1.92* J.32 1.50 1.13 1.05 0.57 0.39 0.26 0.17 
6 SeU 1.11 0.92 0.82 0.87 1.00 0.97 1.05 1.09 1.15 1.17 1.18 1.19 
6 Buy 1.28 1.45 1.49 1.43 1.38 1.40 1.33 1.30 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.26 
6 Buy-seU 0.17 0.53 0.67 0.55 0.38 0.44 0.29 0.22 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.07 
t statistic 0.55 1.84 2.62** 2.44** 1.83* 2.23** 1.55 1.22 0.71 0.61 0.54 0.47 
9 SeU 0.97 0.83 0.86 0.93 1.01 LOO 1.08 1.13 1.19 1.20 1.22 1.23 
9 Buy 1.72 1.75 1.67 1.63 1.56 1.54 1.47 1.41 1.38 1.39 1.40 1.38 
9 Buy-seU 0.75 0.92 0.81 0.70 0.55 0.53 0.39 0.28 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.15 
t statistic 2.22** 3.05** 2.93** 2.69** 2.27** 2.37** 1.82* 1.35 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.83 
12 SeU 1.09 1.07 1.09 1.15 1.19 1.23 1.30 1.37 1.41 1.42 1.43 1.44 
12Buy 1.85 1.81 1.79 1.76 1.71 1.68 1.60 1.55 1.53 1.54 1.53 1.51 
12 Buy-seU 0.76 0.74 0.70 0.60 0.52 0.44 0.30 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.07 
t statistic 129** 2.39** 2.38** 2.11** 1.98** 1.79* 1.28 0.79 0.56 0.57 0.51 0.38 
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Panel C. Results o f t h e Second-Half Subsample Period: 1991-2008 
J K= 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
3 Sell 0.52 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.48 0.46 0.56 0.60 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.69 
3 Buy 0.73 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.78 
3 Buy-sell 0.21 0.35 0.39 0.45 0.27 0.32 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.09 
statistic 0.64 1.25 1.49 1.98** 1.33 1.77* 1.21 1.25 1.14 0.96 0.74 0.69 
6 Sell 0.38 0.34 0.27 0.29 0.43 0.48 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.69 0.71 
6 Buy 0.92 0.96 0.99 0.95 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.83 
6 Buy-sell 0.54 0.63 0.71 0.66 0.43 0.39 0.24 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.14 0.12 
statistic 1.48 1.83* 2.29** 2.24** 1.65 1.65 1.11 1.36 1.26 1.26 0.80 0.70 
9 Sell 0.32 0.20 0.26 0.35 0.45 0.51 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.64 0.70 0.73 
9 Buy 1.03 1.06 1.03 0.95 0.90 0.86 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.80 
9 Buy-sell 0.71 0.86 0.77 0.60 0.45 0.35 0.24 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.10 0.07 
statistic 1.87 2.38** 2.22** 1.84* 1.56 1.35 1.03 1.18 1.04 0.93 0.53 0.35 
# Sell 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.30 0.42 0.51 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.66 0.71 0.75 
# Buy 1.12 1.09 1.03 0.97 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.82 
# Buy-sell 1.04 1.00 0.80 0.67 0.48 0.35 0.30 0.29 0.26 0.18 0.12 0.07 
statistic 2.64** 2.65** 2.17** 1.94** 1.55 1.25 1.17 1.2 1.12 0.81 0.53 0.31 
* Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed T-test. 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.2 presents results ofthe GHH strategy, which is formed based on the ratio 
ofthe last price ofthe formation period divided by the highest price achieved within the 
formation period. Panel A presents results for the whole sample period: 1973-2008. The 
retums of all the self-financed strategies are larger than zero, yet their magnitude are 
decaying as the holding length increases. Take the strategy with 12-month formation 
period for example, the retum is 0.93% for 3-month holding period, yet it decreases 
monotonically to 0.02% when the holding period becomes 60 months. Such decrease 
implies long-term reversal in returns. Retums are more significantly different from zero 
when the holding length is less than 24 months. It seems that strategy JT and GHH 
show similar patterns in terms of retums of self-financing portfolios. Yet, the strategy 
GHH does better than strategy JT, as each strategy of GHH yields higher retums than 
their counterpart in strategy JT. For example, for a (3,12) strategy, the strategy GHH 
make a retum ofO.53% which is larger than the strategy JT which is yielding a retum of 
0.40%. Similar to the strategy JT, strategies GHH of longer formation periods do better 
than the ones with shorter formation periods. Panel B and C present results from 
subsample periods. Both results show similar patterns to the one of the whole sample 
period, yet the retums ofthe first half-period, 1973-1990, are more significant than their 
counterparts in the second half-period, 1991-2008. Figure 4.2 presents graphical 
evidence for the momentum and reversal effect for a formation period of 12 months for 
strategy GHH. From this figure, we see that, very similar to the pattern recorded in 
Figure 4.1, winner portfolio outperforms the loser portfolio in the first 24 months ofthe 
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holding period, then loser portfolio dominate the winner portfolio in most of the rest 
holding periods. This evidence shows that there exists momentum and reversal effect in 
tourism stocks. 
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Table 4.2 Returns ofStrategy GHH 
This table reports average monthly retums for portfolios formed based on the ratio of current price to the 
highest price achieved within the previous J months and held for K months. The buy (sell) portfolio is the 
equally weighted portfolio of one-third of stocks with the highest (lowest) ratio of current price to the 
J-month highest price. The buy-sell portfolio is the zero-cost portfolio by longing the buy portfolio and 
shorting the sell portfolio. The t statistic is for the null hypothesis that the average monthly retums of the 
zero-cost portfolios are not significantly different from 0. Besides the whole sample period, January 1973 
to December 1990, each panel also reports results for subperiods, January 1973 to December 1990 and 
January 1991 to December 2008. 
Panel A. Results ofthe Whole Sample Period: 1973 - 2008 
J K= 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
3 SeU 0.55 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.66 0.68 0.76 0.78 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.91 
3Buy 1.08 1.12 1.13 1.11 1.04 1.03 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
3 Buy-seU 0.53 0.59 0.58 0.53 0.38 0.35 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.06 
tstatistic 2.31** 2.85** 2.99** 2.83** 2.2** 2.12** 1.50 1.41 1.19 0.97 0.74 0.50 
6 SeU 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.65 0.69 0.75 0.78 0.80 0.84 0.88 0.91 
6Buy 1.12 1.19 1.21 1.17 1.09 1.08 1.02 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 
6 Buy-sell 0.63 0.70 0.71 0.61 0.44 0.39 0.27 0.23 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.07 
t statistic 2.54** 3.05** 3.29** 2.94** 2.27** 2.16** 1.58 1.46 1.20 1.01 0.70 0.49 
9 SeU 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.56 0.66 0.70 0.77 0.79 0.83 0.86 0.91 0.93 
9Buy 1.21 1.29 1.27 1.21 1.13 1.10 1.05 1.03 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.99 
9 Buy-seU 0.78 0.85 0.79 0.66 0.47 0.41 0.27 0.24 0.18 0.15 0.09 0.06 
t statistic 3.1** 3.52** 3.44** 2.98** 2.32** 2.16** 1.56 1.45 1.12 0.96 0.59 0.39 
12 SeU 0.40 0.42 0.49 0.59 0.66 0.71 0.79 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.94 0.97 
12Buy 1.33 1.35 1.29 1.22 1.15 1.12 1.06 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.00 0.99 
12 Buy-seU 0.93 0.92 0.79 0.64 0.49 0.41 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.06 0.02 
tstatistic 3.57** 3.7** 3.31** 2.75** 2.31** 2.09** 1.51 1.29 1.04 0.79 0.41 0.16 
Panel B. Results ofthe First-HatfSubsample Period: 1973-1990 
J K= 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
3 SeU 0.85 0.80 0.78 0.82 0.91 0.98 1.06 1.10 1.13 1.17 1.18 1.20 
3 Buy 1.23 1.36 1.40 1.34 1.28 1.27 1.22 1.21 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.19 
3 Buy-sell 0.38 0.56 0.62 0.52 0.37 0.29 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.01 
t statistic 1.34 2.22** 2.67** 2.26** 1.77* 1.44 0.82 0.61 0.40 0.20 0.15 -0.09 
6 Sell 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.80 0.89 0.95 1.04 1.08 1.12 1.14 1.16 1.18 
6 Buy 1.37 1.47 1.51 1.43 1.35 1.34 1.27 1.26 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.21 
6 Buy-sell 0.62 0.73 0.77 0.63 0.46 0.39 0.23 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.03 
tstatistic 2.05** 2.65** 2.99** 2.5** 1.98** 1.71* 1.06 0.88 0.59 0.47 0.37 0.17 
9 Sell 0.68 0.69 0.72 0.79 0.90 0.97 1.08 1.11 1.15 1.16 1.19 1.21 
9 Buy 1.45 1.56 1.55 1.46 1.39 1.39 1.31 1.28 1.25 1.26 1.25 1.24 
9 Buy-seU 0.77 0.87 0.83 0.68 0.49 0.42 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.03 
t statistic 2.4** 2.98** 3.04** 2.55** 1.95* 1.76* 1.03 0.81 0.51 0.48 0.31 0.17 
12 Sell 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.84 0.92 0.99 1.10 1.14 1.17 1.19 1.22 1.24 
12 Buy 1.57 1.61 1.55 1.48 1.42 1.41 1.33 1.29 1.27 1.26 1.26 1.25 
12 Buy-sell 0.84 0.89 0.79 0.64 0.50 0.42 0.23 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.00 
tstatistic 2.61** 2.93** 2.73** 2.23** 1.87* 1.63 0.98 0.66 0.44 0.37 0.18 0.01 
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Panel C. Results o f the Second-Half Subsample Period: 1991-2008 
J K= 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
3 Sell 0.25 0.26 0.31 0.33 0.41 0.39 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.51 0.57 0.61 
3 Buy 0.94 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.81 0.79 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 
3 Buy-sell 0.69 0.62 0.55 0.55 0.40 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.17 0.14 
tstatistic 1.88* 1.89* 1.74* 1.83* 1.42 1.57 1.27 1.32 1.20 1.08 0.82 0.70 
6 Sell 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.32 0.42 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.54 0.60 0.64 
6 B u y 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.84 0.82 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 
6 Buy-sell 0.63 0.66 0.65 0.60 0.42 0.39 0.30 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.13 0.11 
t statistic 1.62 1.81* 1.87* 1.79* 1.35 1.39 1.17 1.16 1.07 0.91 0.60 0.49 
9 Sell 0.17 0.20 0.25 0.33 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.55 0.63 0.66 
9 B u y 0.97 1.02 0.99 0.97 0.87 0.82 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.74 
9 Buy-sell 0.80 0.82 0.75 0.64 0.45 0.39 0.32 0.31 0.25 0.20 0.12 0.08 
t statistic 2.04**2.15**2.03** 1.81* 1.42 1.34 1.18 1.2 1.03 0.84 0.51 0.36 
12 Sell 0.08 0.12 0.23 0.33 0.40 0.43 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.58 0.65 0.69 
12Buy 1.09 1.08 1.02 0.97 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.74 
12 Buy-sell 1.02 0.96 0.79 0.63 0.48 0.40 0.31 0.29 0.24 0.18 0.09 0.04 
t statistic 2.49**2.41**2.08** 1.74* 1.46 1.35 1.15 1.13 0.98 0.72 0.38 0.19 
* Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed T-test. 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3 presents result ofstrategy GHL, which is formed based on the ratio oflast 
price ofthe formation period divided by the lowest price achieved within the formation 
period. Similar to the strategy JT and GHH, the strategy GHL shows momentum effect 
lasting for 24 months as self-financed portfolio have significant positive retums during 
this period. However, this strategy does worst among the three strategies, as it yields 
lowest retums of self-financed portfolio compared with its counterparts in strategy JT 
and GHH. Besides, some strategies with 60-month holding periods show negative 
retums, imply that long-term reversal effect is more serious in this strategy than the 
others. In its subsample periods, the difference becomes more significant. In the 
first-halfsubsample period, rarely are retums statistically significant. Besides, retums of 
all strategies with holding periods more than 24 months are negative. However, in the 
second half of the period, the strategy shows stronger momentum effect than the 
first-half sample period: almost all strategies yield higher positive retums with more 
significant levels. Very similar to the pattern depicted in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, the 
changes of portfolio retums also show momentum and reversal effects in Figure 4.3, 
which presents graphical evidence for the momentum and reversal effect for a formation 
period of 12 months for strategy GHL. From this figure, we see that, winner portfolio 
outperforms the loser portfolio in the first 20 months of the holding period, then loser 
portfolio dominate the winner portfolio in most of the rest holding periods. This 
evidence also shows that there exists momentum and reversal effect in tourism stocks. 
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Table 4.3 Returns ofStrategy GHL 
This table reports average monthly retums for portfolios formed based on the ratio ofcurrent price to the 
lowest price achieved within the previous J months and held for K month. The buy (sell) portfolio is the 
equally weighted portfolio of one-third of stocks with the highest (lowest) ratio of current price to the 
J-month lowest price. The buy-sell portfolio is the zero-cost portfolio by longing the buy portfolio and 
shorting the sell portfolio. The t statistic is for the null hypothesis that the average monthly retums of the 
zero-cost portfolios are not significantly different from 0. Besides the whole sample period, January 1973 
to December 1990, each panel also reports results for subperiods, January 1973 to December 1990 and 
January 1991 to December 2008. 
Panel A. Results ofthe Whole Sample Period: 1973 - 2008 
j K= 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
3 SeU ^ ~ ~ 0 ^ ~ ~ 0 . 7 9 0.80 0.84 0 . 8 3 ~ ~ W ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ 0 ^ ~ ~ 0 ^ ~ ~ 0 ^ 
3Buy 0.83 0.92 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.92 
3 Buy-seU -0.08 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
tstatistic -0.51 0.96 1.57 1.46 0.88 1.36 0.28 0.39 -0.44 -0.49 -0.62 -0.71 
6 SeU 0.86 0.76 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.84 0.86 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.95 
6Buy 0.92 1.06 1.06 1.02 0.99 0.98 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.93 
6 Buy-seU 0.06 0.29 0.32 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
tstatistic 0.39 2.11** 2.69** 2.46** 2.13** 2.37** 1.03 0.89 0.08 0.21 -0.04 -0.32 
9SeU 0.83 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.75 0.77 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.95 
9Buy 1.06 1.11 1.10 1.07 1.03 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.94 
9 Buy-seU 0.23 0.39 0.40 0.36 0.28 0.23 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.02 
t statistic 1.32 2.54** 2.96** 2.89** 2.55** 2.27** 0.96 0.70 0.06 0.27 0.04 -0.25 
12 SeU 0.81 0.68 0.66 0.68 0.73 0.78 0.86 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.96 
12Buy 1.11 1.11 1.12 1.09 1.05 0.99 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.93 
12 Buy-sell 0.30 0.42 0.47 0.40 0.32 0.21 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
tstatistic 1.67* 2.65** 3.25** 3.04** 2.68** 1.97* 0.84 0.50 0.04 0.19 -0.10 -0.41 
PanelB. Results ofthe First-HatfSubsample Period: 1973-1990 
J K=^ 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
3 SeU U 3 ~ L 0 8 ~ ~ L ^ " " U 0 ~ ~ U 3 ~ ~ U 3 ~ ~ L 2 0 ~ ~ L 2 0 ~ ~ L B ~ ~ L 2 5 ~ ~ " L 2 5 ~ ~ L ^ 
3Buy 0.98 1.16 1.21 1.19 1.14 1.15 1.13 1.14 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.12 
3 Buy-sell -0.24 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.01 0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 
tstatistic -1.07 0.50 0.89 0.65 0.11 0.19 -0.69 -0.59 -1.32 -1.46 -1.42 -1.60 
6SeU 1.18 1.03 1.03 1.06 1.09 1.08 1.16 1.17 1.22 1.22 1.23 1.25 
6 Buy 1.08 1.30 1.31 1.25 1.21 1.22 1.18 1.17 1.13 1.14 1.14 1.14 
6 Buy-sell -0.11 0.27 0.28 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 
tstatistic -0.44 1.35 1.58 1.23 0.86 1.09 0.16 -0.07 -0.81 -0.79 -0.88 -1.13 
9 SeU 1.17 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.07 1.07 1.17 1.20 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.25 
9Buy 1.24 1.34 1.34 1.29 1.24 1.23 1.17 1.15 1.12 1.14 1.14 1.13 
9 Buy-sell 0.07 0.34 0.36 0.28 0.18 0.15 0.00 -0.05 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 
tstatistic 0.29 1.59 1.88* 1.65 1.08 1.04 -0.01 -0.37 -0.92 -0.79 -0.83 -1.15 
12 SeU 1.15 0.96 0.94 0.99 1.04 1.07 1.16 1.20 1.23 1.22 1.23 1.25 
12Buy 1.30 1.31 1.33 1.26 1.24 1.22 1.15 1.12 1.11 1.13 1.12 1.11 
12 Buy-sell 0.16 0.35 0.39 0.27 0.20 0.15 -0.01 -0.08 -0.13 -0.09 -0.11 -0.14 
tstatistic 0.60 1.57 1.96* 1.51 1.14 0.94 -0.06 -0.55 -0.99 -0.78 -0.92 -1.26 
39 
Panel C. Results of the Second-Half Subsample Period: 1991-2008 
j K= 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
3 Sell 0.59 0.54 0.50 0.51 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.66 
3 Buy 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.71 
3 Buy-sell 0.09 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 
tstatistic 0.49 0.88 1.35 1.43 1.14 1.76* 1.12 1.12 0.63 0.66 0.46 0.55 
6 Sell 0.53 0.49 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.53 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.63 0.65 
6 B u y 0.76 0.81 0.82 0.79 0.76 0.74 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.71 
6 Buy-sell 0.24 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.30 0.27 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.07 
tstatistic 1.06 1.62 2.24**2.26**2.23**2.34** 1.4 1.39 0.97 1.13 0.85 0.73 
9 Sell 0.49 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.47 0.53 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.64 0.66 
9 B u y 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.85 0.82 0.77 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.74 
9 Buy-sell 0.40 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.39 0.30 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.08 
tstatistic 1.58 2** 2.3** 2.41**2.57**2.21** 1.44 1.38 1.01 1.15 0.87 0.82 
12 Sell 0.47 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.49 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.62 0.66 0.67 
12Buy 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.86 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 
12 Buy-sell 0.45 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.44 0.28 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.08 
tstatistic 1.76* 2.16**2.62**2.76** 2.7** 1.89* 1.31 1.29 1.06 1.05 0.77 0.7 
* Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed T-test. 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3 DECOMPOSITION OFRETURNS 
In this section, I decompose the retum of the winner-loser portfolio into two parts, 
the difference between the winner and the middle portfolio and the difference between 
the middle and loser portfolio, namely, Rw-RM, and RM-RL, where RM denotes returns of 
middle portfolios. It reveals that the winner-loser effect is not symmetric in most ofthe 
cases. 
Table 4.4 presents the result of JT strategy formed based on previous returns. In 
panel A, for the whole sample period, 1973-2008, except for several momentum 
strategies with 3-month formation period, such as JT(3,3) and JT(3,6), winner portfolios 
tend to remain winner portfolios and loser portfolios tend to remain loser portfolios 
when the holding period less than two years. As the holding periods become longer, the 
difference between winner and middle portfolio and the difference between middle and 
loser portfolio become smaller. Especially for the difference between winner and middle 
portfolios, regardless the formation periods, it become insignificantly different from 
zero as the holding period extends. As retum of each self-financed portfolio is the mean 
of K self-financed portfolios formed in the previous K months, the diminishing of 
Rw-RM, and RM-RL implies that reversal occurs as the holding period increases. By and 
large, the overall picture which emerges is that the winner-loser effect is not symmetric. 
As the difference is mainly due to the difference between the middle and the loser 
portfolio, the loser portfolio is the driving force of the effect. Panel B and C investigate 
the phenomena for subsample periods. It shows similar pictures as the one depicted in 
42 
the whole sample period that the differences of winner and middle portfolio and the 
differences between middle and loser portfolio diminish as the holding length increases. 
However, the winner-loser effect for the first-half subsample period is much more 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.5 presents the result for GHH strategy. Panel A shows the picture of the 
whole sample period: 1973-2008. It shows clearly that the retums of loser portfolio 
increase monotonically as the holding length becomes longer. For example, for the 
6-month formation period, the retums of the strategies increase from 0.50% for 3-month 
holding period to 0.91% for 60-months. On the other hand, the retums of the winner 
portfolios decrease in the opposite direction yet with a lower speed. Take the 6 month 
formation period for example, the retum decrease from 1.12% for 3 months to 0.98% 
for 60 months. As both retums of winner and loser portfolios reflect accumulative 
effects, such phenomenon implies retums reversal in the long-term period. For the GHH 
strategy, it shows that the retums of self-financed portfolio is driven by the difference 
between winner and middle portfolio and the difference between middle and loser 
portfolio in a similar magnitude in the first 36 months of holding period. Then the 
retums are mainly driven by difference between middle and loser portfolios. Panel B 
and C present results from subsample periods. Both subsample periods show similar 
retum pattem to the one of the whole sample period. The only difference is that they 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.6 presents the result for GHL strategy. Similar to JT and GHH strategies, 
difference between winner and lower portfolios is quite significant for the holding 
months less than 24 months. However, as the holding periods increase, the difference is 
diminishing. This phenomenon is due to the retum increase of the loser portfolio and the 
decrease of the winner portfolio in the long run. By and large, the middle portfolios 
increase monotonically as the holding length increases. As the retums of each portfolio 
are accumulative results of several portfolios constructed in previous months, it implies 
that momentum effect exists in the short-term period and reversal occurs in the long-run 
period. Moreover, the middle portfolios present reversal effect stronger than the ones of 
loser portfolios, as most of the difference between middle and loser portfolios are 
negative when the holding period is longer than 24 months. Panel B and C present 
results for subsample periods. It reveals that the long-term reversal is more obvious for 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Previous literature (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman (1987)) records that the winners 
outperform losers in all months except January, but the losers significantly outperform 
the winners in January. In this section, I investigate whether the seasonality 
phenomenon exists in tourism industry and for which kind of strategy the seasonality 
effect is more significant. 
Table 4.7 reports the momentum profits in January and non-January for the tourism 
stock sample. Here, I use JT and GHH(L) strategies formed based on past 12-month 
price performance and hold for different months up to 60 months. Panel A reports the 
JT strategy which is constructed based on continually compounded previous retums of 
12 months. It shows that the momentum profits in January for this sample are all 
negative for strategies with different holding lengths. On the other hand, the average 
momentum profits in months outside January are positive with significant levels. It is 
quite interesting that though magnitude of the positive returns of months excluding 
January decreases as the holding lengths increases, the negative retums of January 
varies little as the holding periods become longer. For example, for the whole sample 
period, 1973-2008, the momentum profits in January vary from -4.76% to -4.14%. Yet 
for momentum profits in months outside January, the profits decrease monotonically 
from 1.40% to 0.45%, almost 60% decrease. For the subsample period, 1973-1990 and 
1991-2008, the results show similar pattern. However, the result for the second-half 
sample period is much more significant than their counterpart of the first-half sample 
52 
period. 
Panel B presents the result for GHH strategy. It also records strong seasonality 
effect for all the sample periods. All the momentum returns in January are significantly 
less than zero and all the average momentum retums for months outside January are 
greater than zero. Besides, the absolute values of retums are all decreasing as the 
holding months increasing. Unlike the one in JT strategy, the results in the two 
subsample periods show similar magnitudes. 
Panel C presents the result for GHL strategy. Very different from the ones recorded 
in the previous strategies, there is no significant seasonality in the strategy GHL which 
is constructed based on the ratio of last price divided by the lowest price achieved in the 
previous 12 months. Though most results in January are negative, they are very 
insignificant. This phenomenon is not unique for the whole sample period, when I 
divided the whole period into two subsample periods, it remain exists. So, why the GHL 
is so different from the other strategies in terms of seasonality effect? I will tum back to 
this question in the following section. 
53 
Table 4.7 Seasonality in Momentum Profits 
This table reports the average monthly momentum portfolio retums for January as well as 
non-January months ofthree different investing strategies. In panel A, the portfolios are formed 
based on continuously compounded retums over the previous 12 months and held for K months. 
In panel B (C), the portfolios are formed based on the ratio of current price to the highest 
(lowest) price achieved within the previous 12 months and held K months. The t- stat is for the 
null hypothesis that the average monthly retums of the zero-cost portfolios are not significantly 
different from 0. Besides the whole sample period, January 1973 to December 1990, each panel 
also reports results for subperiods, January 1973 to December 1990 and January 1991 to 
December 2008. 
Panel A. Retums of P o r t M o s in Strategy JT 
i^ 3 6 9 n 
Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy Sell B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat 
73-08 Jan 5.05 9.81 A.% -3.32 * 4.93 9.75 -4.82 -3.62 * 4.87 9.83 4.96 -3.91 * 4.85 9.84 4.99 4.06 * 
Feb-Dec 1.16 -0.25 1.40 6.03 * 1.13 -0.25 1.38 6.23 * 1.09 -0.17 1.26 5.94 * 1.04 -0.10 1.14 5.68 * 
AU 0.58 1.48 0.90 3.50 * 0.57 1.44 0.87 3.56 * 0.66 1.40 0.75 3.18 * 0.72 1.36 0.64 2.83 * 
73~90 Jan 701 9 40 -2.39 -1.23 6.90 9.40 -2.50 -1.44 6.87 9.54 -2.66 -1.67 * 6.81 9.72 -2.91 -1.83 * 
Feb-Dec 1.40 0.36 1.03 3.33 * 1.36 0.34 1.02 3.49 * 1.34 0.35 0.99 3.57 * 1.31 0.40 0.91 3.41 * 
AU 1.09 1.85 0.76 2.29 * 1.07 1.81 0.74 2.39 * 1.09 1.79 0.70 2.38 * 1.15 1.76 0.60 111 * 
91-08 Jan 3 20 10.19 -6.99 -3.47 * 3.06 10.08 -7.02 -3.68 * 2.98 10.10 -7.13 -3.85 * 3.00 9.95 -6.95 -3.93 * 
Feb-Dec 0.93 -0.84 1.77 5.12 * 0.91 -0.82 1.73 5.24 * 0.85 -0.67 1.52 4.77 * 0.79 -0.58 1.37 4.57 * 
AU 0.08 1.12 1.04 2.64 * 0.09 1.09 1.00 2.65 * 0.23 1.03 0.80 2.17 * 0.30 0.97 0.67 1.94 * 
K= 18 24 30 36 
Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat 
73~08 Jan 4.82 9.74 -4.92 -4.13 * 4.66 9.47 4.81 4.45 * 4.61 9.27 4.66 4.81 * 4.58 9.06 4.48 4.97 * 
Feb-Dec 0.99 0.00 0.99 5.62 * 0.96 0.10 0.86 5.36 * 0.93 0.18 0.75 4.90 * 0.90 0.24 0.66 4.51 * 
AU 1.30 0.80 0.50 2.46 * 1.27 0.87 0.40 2.12 * 1.23 0.93 0.30 1.72 * 1.20 0.97 0.24 1.42 
73~90 Jan 6.75 9.76 -3.01 -1.92 * 6.49 9.93 -3.44 -2.30 * 6.28 10.02 -3.74 -2.71 * 6.20 9.93 -3.73 -2.95 * 
Feb-Dec 1.27 0.44 0.83 3.46 * 1.26 0.47 0.79 3.56 * 1.19 0.53 0.66 3.13 * 1.14 0.61 0.52 2.55 * 
AU 1.71 1.19 0.52 1.98 * 1.68 1.23 0.44 1.79 * 1.60 1.30 0.30 1.28 1.55 1.37 0.18 0.79 
91-08 Jan 3.00 9.72 -6.72 -3.93 * 2.94 9.04 -6.10 -3.99 * 3.04 8.56 -5.52 4 0 5 * 3.06 8.24 -5.18 -4.00 * 
Feb-Dec 0.71 -0.42 1.14 4.46 * 0.68 -0.26 0.94 4.00 * 0.67 -0.16 0.83 3.78 * 0.67 -0.12 0.79 3.80 * 
AU 0.9Q 0.42 0.48 1.55 0.87 0.51 0.35 1.25 0.87 0.57 0.30 1.17 0.87 0.58 0.29 1.20 
K= 42 48 54 60 
Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy Sell B-S tstat Buy Sell B-S tstat Buy Sell B-S tstat 
73-08 Jan 4.61 8.88 -4.27 -5.04 * 4.62 8.80 4.18 -5.08 * 4.56 8.73 4.17 -5.20 * 4.51 8.65 4.14 -5.23 * 
Feb-Dec 0.89 0.29 0.59 4.18 * 0.88 0.34 0.54 3.95 * 0.87 0.38 0.49 3.78 * 0.86 0.41 0.45 3.61 * 
All 1.19 1.00 0.19 1.21 1.19 1.04 0.15 0.98 1.17 1.06 0.11 0.74 1.16 1.09 0.07 0.49 
73-90 Jan 6.16 9.78 -3.62 -3.10 * 6.11 9.68 -3.57 -3.28 * 6.03 9.59 -3.56 -3.51 * 5.99 9.44 -3.44 -3.57 * 
Feb-Dec 1.12 0.67 0.45 2.24 * 1.14 0.69 0.45 2.29 * 1.13 0.71 0.43 2.31 * 1.12 0.74 0.38 2.19 * 
AU 1.53 1.41 0.12 0.56 1.54 1.42 0.12 0.57 1.53 1.43 0.10 0.51 1,51 1.44 0.07 0.38 
91-08 Jan 3.15 8.03 -4.88 -3.95 * 3.20 7.96 -4.76 -3.83 * 3.17 7.92 4.75 -3,82 * 3.11 7.91 -4.79 -3.84 * 
Feb-Dec 0.65 -0.07 0.73 3.67 * 0.63 0.00 0.63 3.28 * 0.61 0,05 0.56 3.02 * 0.61 0,10 0.51 2.90 * 
All 0.86 0.60 0.26 1.12 0.85 0.66 0.18 0.81 0.83 0.71 0.12 0.53 0.82 0.75 0.07 0.31 
* Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
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Pane l B. Re tums o f P o r t M o s in Strategy G H H 
i^ 3 i 9 l2 
Buy SeU B-S ts ta t Buy SeU B-S ts ta t Buy SeU B-S ts ta t Buy S e U _ _ B ^ S _ _ t s t a t 
73-08 Jan 4.19 10.20 -6.02 -4.07 * 4.28 9.89 -5.62 -4.05 * 4.13 10.07 -5.93 4 5 1 * 4.05 10.15 -6.11 -4.92 * 
Feb-Dec 107 -049 1.56 6.92 * 1.08 -0.44 1.52 6.93 * 1.03 -0.38 1.40 6.77 * 0.96 -0.28 1.25 6.27 * 
AU 0 40 1.33 0.93 3.57 * 0.42 1.35 0.92 3.70 * 0.49 1.29 0.79 3.31 * 0.59 1.22 0.64 2.75 * 
73-90 Jan 5 32 10.49 -5.18 -3.05 * 5.51 10.20 -4.69 -3.18 * 5.37 10.55 -5.18 -3.59 * 5.21 10.73 -5.51 -3.89 * 
Feb-Dec 1.23 -0.16 1.39 4.82 * 1.26 -0.14 1.40 5.02 * 1.21 -0.13 1.34 5.19 * 1.14 -0.06 1.20 4.79 * 
AU 0.72 1.57 0.84 2.61 * 0.72 1.61 0.89 2.93 * 0.76 1.55 0.79 2.73 * 0.84 1.48 0.64 2.23 * 
91-08 Jan 3.06 9.91 -6.85 -2.79 * 3.05 9.59 -6.54 -2.75 * 2.90 9.58 -6.68 -2.99 * 2.88 9.58 -6.70 -3.23 * 
Feb-Dec 0.92 -0.82 1.73 4.99 * 0.90 -0.74 1.64 4.84 * 0.85 -0.62 1.47 4.52 * 0.79 -0.51 1.30 4.19 * 
AU 0.08 1.09 1.02 2.49 * 0.12 1.08 0.96 2.41 * 0.23 1.02 0.79 2.08 * 0.33 0.97 0.63 1.74 * 
K= 18 24 30 36 
Buy SeU B-S t stat Buy Sell B-S t stat Buy Sell B-S t stat Buy S e U _ _ ^ _ _ L ^ _ 
73-08 Jan 4.06 9.90 -5.84 -5.24 * 4.10 9.61 -5.51 -5.47 * 4.19 9.24 -5.06 -5.50 * 4.31 8.90 ^4.59 -5.33 * 
Feb-Dec 0.88 -0.18 1.06 5.86 * 0.85 -0.10 0.95 5.62 * 0.78 0.02 0.76 4.79 * 0.74 0.09 0.66 4.38 * 
AU 1.15 0.66 0.49 2.31 * 1.12 0.71 0.41 2.09 * 1.06 0.79 0.27 1.51 1.04 0.82 0.22 1.29 
73-90 Jan 5.31 10.52 -5.21 -3.92 * 5.31 10.30 4 9 8 -4.19 * 5.30 10.04 4 7 4 ^ 6 1 * 5.43 9.71 4 2 8 -4.68 * 
Feb-Dec 1.07 0.05 1.02 4.34 * 1.06 0.15 0.91 3.96 * 0.97 0.28 0.69 3.18 * 0.91 0.36 0.55 2.68 * 
AU 1.42 0.92 0.50 1.87 * 1.41 0.99 0.42 1.63 1.33 1.10 0.23 0.98 1.29 1.14 0.15 0.66 
91-08 Jan 2 81 9.28 -6.46 -3.56 * 2.89 8.93 -6.04 -3.65 * 3.07 8.44 -5.37 -3.46 * 3.19 8.10 -4.91 -3.30 * 
Feb-Dec 0.70 -0.41 1.11 3.99 * 0.64 -0.34 0.98 3.97 * 0.58 -0.25 0.83 3.58 * 0.57 -0.19 0.76 3.49 * 
AU 0.88 0.40 0.48 1.46 0.83 0.43 0.40 1.35 0.79 0.48 0.31 1.15 0.79 0.50 0.29 U 3 _ 
K= 42 48 54 60 
Buy SeU B-S t stat Buy SeU B-S t stat Buy SeU B-S t stat Buy SeU B-S t stat 
73~08 Jan 4 34 8 72 4 38 -5.23 * 4.33 8.60 >4.27 -5.16 * 4.38 8.41 -4.03 4 9 5 * 4.38 8.25 -3.87 4 9 5 * 
Feb-Dec 071 0.13 0.58 4.05 * 0.71 0.18 0.53 3.78 * 0.69 0.26 0.43 3.25 * 0.68 0.31 0.38 2.93 * 
AU 1.02 0.85 0.17 1.04 1.01 0.88 0.13 0.79 1.00 0.94 0.06 0.41 0.99 0.97 0.02 0.16 
73~90 Jan 5.50 9.54 4.04 4 7 8 * 5.51 9.38 -3.87 4 9 0 * 5.58 9.13 -3.55 4.88 * 5.57 8.87 -3.30 4 6 2 * 
Feb-Dec 0.88 0.41 0.47 2.38 * 0.88 0.44 0.43 2.28 * 0.86 0.50 0.36 1.98 * 0.85 0.55 0.30 1.72 * 
AU 127 1.17 0.09 0.44 1.26 1.19 0.07 0.37 1.26 1.22 0.03 0.18 1.25 1.24 0.00 0.01 
91~08 Jan 3.18 7.91 4 7 3 -3.22 * 3.15 7.83 4 6 8 -3.17 * 3.19 7.69 ^.50 -3.06 * 3.20 7.63 4 4 4 -3.16 * 
Feb-Dec 0.55 -0.15 0.70 3.32 * 0.54 -0.08 0.62 3.04 * 0.52 0.01 0.51 2.59 * 0.51 0.06 0.45 2.40 * 
AU 0.76 0.52 0.24 0.98 0.76 0.58 0.18 0.72 0.74 0.65 0.09 0.38 0.74 0.69 0.04 0.19 
Pane l C. Returns ofPor t foUos in Strategy GHL 
^ 3 i 9 n 
Buy SeU B-S t stat Buy SeU B-S t stat Buy SeU B-S t stat Buy SeU B-S t stat 
73~08 Jan 6.56 7.55 -0.98 -1.15 6.68 7.13 -0.46 -0.57 6.84 6.93 -0.09 -0.13 6.81 7.01 -0.21 -0.33 
Feb-Dec 0 62 0 20 0.42 2.31 * 0.60 0.10 0.50 3.18 * 0.60 0.09 0.52 3.60 * 0.56 0.11 0.46 3.46 * 
AU 0.81 1.11 0.30 1.67 * 0.68 1.11 0.42 2.65 * 0.66 1.12 0.47 3.25 * 0.68 1.09 0.40 3.04 * 
73-90 Jan 7 73 8.03 -0.30 -0.25 7.90 7.80 0.10 0.09 7.84 7.77 0.07 0.08 7.73 7.89 -0.16 -0.21 
Feb-Dec 0 72 0.52 0.20 0.76 0.71 0.33 0.37 1.65 0.74 0.32 0.42 2.06 * 0.67 0.36 0.31 1.69 * 
AU 1.15 1.30 0.16 0.60 0.96 1.31 0.35 1.57 0.94 1.33 0.39 1.96 * 0.99 1.26 0.27 1.51 
91-08 Jan 5.39 7.06 -1.67 -1.33 5.46 6.46 -1.01 -0.79 5.84 6.08 -0.24 -0.22 5.89 6.14 -0.25 -0.25 
Feb-Dec 0.52 -0.13 0.64 2.55 * 0.49 -0.14 0.63 2.86 * 0.47 -0.14 0.61 3.02 * 0.46 -0.14 0.60 3.19 * 
All 0.47 0.92 0.45 1.76 * 0.41 0.90 0.50 2.16 * 0.38 0.92 0.54 2.62 * 0.38 0.91 0.53 2.76 * 
K= 18 24 30 36 
Buy Sell B-S ts ta t Buy Sell B-S ts ta t Buy SeU B-S ts tat Buy SeU B-S ts ta t 
73-08 Jan 6.65 7.30 -0.64 -1.22 6.41 7.35 -0.94 -1.86 * 6.30 7.33 -1.03 -2.31 * 6.36 7.13 -0.78 -1.82 * 
Feb-Dec 0.54 0.13 0.41 3.39 * 0.50 0.18 0.32 2.95 * 0,46 0.27 0.19 1.82 * 0.44 0.32 0.12 1.27 
All 1.05 0.73 0.32 2.68 * 0.99 0.78 0.21 1.97 * 0.95 0.86 0.09 0.84 0.93 0.88 0.05 0.50 
73-90 Jan 7.61 8.30 -0.69 -0.89 7.39 8.45 -1.06 -1.28 7.13 8.51 -1.38 -1.92 * 7.23 8.25 -1.03 -1.54 
Feb-Dec 0.66 0.38 0.28 1.59 0.66 0.40 0.26 1.66 * 0.61 0.50 0.11 0.77 0.56 0.55 0.01 0.08 
All 1.24 1.04 0.20 1.14 1.22 1.07 0.15 0.94 1.15 1.16 -0.01 -0.06 1.12 1.20 -0.08 -0.55 
91-08 Jan 5.70 6.29 -0.59 -0.80 5.44 6.26 -0.82 -1.35 5.48 6.15 -0.68 -1.26 5.49 6.01 -0.52 -0.96 
Feb-Dec 0.42 -0.12 0.53 3.27 * 0.34 -0.03 0.38 2.54 * 0.31 0.05 0.26 1.82 * 0.31 0.08 0.24 1.72 * 
All 0.86 0.42 0.44 2.70 * 0.77 0.49 0.28 1.89 * 0.74 0.55 0.18 1.31 0.74 0.57 0.17 1.29 
K= 42 48 54 60 
Buy Sell B-S t s ta t Buy Sell B-S t s ta t Buy SeU B-S ts ta t Buy Sell B-S ts ta t 
73-08 Jan 6.37 7.01 -0.64 -1.58 6.31 6.90 -0.59 -1.51 6.21 6.79 -0.57 -1.52 6.12 6.67 -0.55 -1.55 
Feb-Dec 0.43 0.37 0.06 0.68 0.45 0.38 0.07 0.84 0.45 0.41 0.04 0.52 0.46 0.45 0.01 0.17 
AU 0.92 0.92 0.00 0.04 0.94 0.92 0.02 0.19 0.93 0.94 -0.01 -0.10 0.93 0.96 -0.03 -0.41 
73-90 Jan 7.22 8.13 -0.90 -1.49 7.13 7.95 -0.82 -1.47 7.02 7.84 -0.82 -1,59 6.92 7.75 -0.84 -1.72 
Feb-Dec 0.55 0.61 -0.06 -0.44 0.58 0.61 -0.03 -0.23 0.59 0.63 -0.04 -0.36 0.58 0.66 -0.08 -0,69 
All 1.11 1.23 -0.13 -0.99 1.13 1.22 -0.09 -0.78 1.12 1.23 -0.11 -0.92 1.11 1.25 -0.14 -1.26 
91-08 Jan 5.51 5.89 -0.38 -0.68 5.48 5.85 -0.37 -0.65 5.41 5.73 -0.33 -0.59 5.33 5.58 -0,25 -0.50 
Feb-Dec 0.30 0.12 0.18 1.41 0.31 0.14 0.17 1.42 0.32 0.19 0.13 1.10 0.34 0.23 0.11 0.96 
All 0.74 0.60 0.13 1.06 0.75 0.62 0.13 1.05 0.75 0.66 0.09 0.77 0.75 0.67 0.08 0.70 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE MARKET 
In the last chapter, I examine whether there exists momentum and reversal effects in the 
cross section of tourism stock retums. By using three trading strategies (JT, GHH and 
GHL) to explore these anomalous phenomena, I find that in the short and medium-term 
(less than 24 months) stock retums show significant persistence that former winners still 
outperform the losers and in the long-term (24 to 60 months) stock retums show 
reversal that former losers outperform former winners. At closer inspection long horizon 
reversals are mainly driven by the outperformance of the loser portfolio during the 
holding period. Besides, evidence shows strong seasonality in retums of loser portfolios 
generated by strategy JT and GHH. As tourism stock is a subsample ofthe general US 
stock market we are curious to know whether the general market show similar 
momentum and reversal phenomena during the same sample period. If it is, we want to 
know what the difference between these two samples with different scopes. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. First I present the result from the 
general market in terms of profitability of strategies, movements of retums and 
seasonality. Then based on test results of this and the last chapter, I discuss the 
differences between the tourism stock and the overall stock market in terms of 
magnitude of the observed pricing anomalies. 
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5.1 MOMENTUM AND REVERSAL EFFECT IN GENERAL MARKET 
For the investigation of general market I use strategy JT and GHH(L) formed based on 
past 12-month price information and hold for different periods up to 60 months. In past 
literature, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) first documents medium-term (less than 12 
months) momentum effect in general market and find that the profit of a JT(3,3) 
strategy can be as high as 1.36%. In their study, they sort stocks based on past returns 
and divided them into ten equally weighted portfolios. Stocks ranked in the top 10% 
constitute the winner portfolio, and stocks ranked in the bottom 10% constitute the loser 
portfolio. Then self-financing portfolios are constructed by longing the winner and 
shorting the loser portfolio. In my investigation, I divided stocks into three portfolios 
according to their rankings, where the top 33% stocks form the winner portfolios and 
the bottom 33% stocks form the loser portfolios. As portfolios formed by top or bottom 
10% stocks contain more extreme values, results of my investigation are expected not to 
be as significant as the ones of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
5.1.1 Profitability and Return Performance 
Table 5.1 presents the result from the general market. In panel A, I compare the 
retum performance of the three strategies with 12-month holding period during the 
whole sample period: 1973-2008. For all the three strategies, it can be easily found that 
retums ofthe loser portfolios (the buy portfolio) are increasing as the holding length K 
becomes longer, and the returns of the winner portfolios are declining. For the short to 
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medium-term, less than 12 months, momentum effect is quite significant for all the 
three strategies: former winner still dominate former loser and the self-financing 
portfolios eam a positive profits. Comparing the three strategies with each other, it 
shows that strategy GHH yields the highest profits yet the strategy JT performs the 
worst. Besides, the momentum effects of strategy GHH(L) are more persistent than the 
one of strategy JT as profits of self-financing portfolios tum negative after 18 months 
for strategy GHH(L) yet the portfolio retum tum negative only after 12 months for 
strategy JT. By and large, all the three strategies show similar pattem in retum 
movements. 
Figure 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 present graphical evidences for the momentum and 
reversal effect. As these figures show average monthly retums of K-month (up to 60 
months) after formation, we can get better knowledge about the performance of 
individual winner and loser portfolio during the holding period. Figure 5.1 shows 
changes in portfolio retums for strategy JT. It can be observed that the winner portfolios 
outperform the middle and losers portfolios in the first 6 months after the formation, 
showing a momentum effect. Ever since the seventh month after the formation, the 
momentum effect is replaced by a reversal effect that both the middle and loser 
portfolios perform superiorly than the former winner portfolios. Such reversal effect can 
persist up to the end of holding period. Figure 5.2 and 5.2 depict movements of 
portfolio retums for strategy GHH and GHL. It shows that the two strategies ranking 
portfolios based on past price levels show similar patterns in their portfolio return 
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movements: the winner portfolios dominate the loser portfolios in the first 9 to 10 
months after the formation and them loser portfolios exceed the winner portfolio in the 
rest ofholding period. It seems that the momentum effect lasts longer for strategy GHH 
and GHL than the one of strategy JT. Besides and more interestingly, the movements of 
portfolio retum for strategy GHH and GHL show special seasonal effect which cannot 
be observed for strategy JT. During the reversal period, the retum of loser portfolio 
experiences a suddenly increase for every 12 months. After the dramatic increase, its 
retums decrease monotonically for the rest of 12 months and waiting for the next bound 
up. For winner portfolios, a reverse pattern appears that retum of winner portfolio 
experiencesjump down every 12 months and then recovers slightly during the rest of 12 
months. As the increase of the loser portfolio and decrease of the winner portfolio 
occurs almost simultaneously, spread between loser and winner portfolios widens every 
12 months and then tums smaller for the rest ofmonths. 
Panel B records the evidence from the first-half subsample period: 1973 to 1990. In 
this sub-period, it shows that all ofthe three strategies show momentum effect which is 
more significant and persistent than the one in the whole sample period. For all the three 
strategies, former winners still outperform former losers in the first 24 months, though 
after 12 months the results are not very significant. Comparing the three strategies, 
strategy GHH and JT do better than the strategy GHL as self-financing portfolios yield 
much higher profits in GHH and JT than their counterpart in strategy GHL. For example 
for the (12,6) strategies, strategy GHH and JT yield profits of 0.83% and 0.60% 
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respectively, and the strategy JT yields 0.33%. 
Panel C presents evidence from the second-half subsample period: 1990 to 2008. 
Very different from evidences ofthe whole and the first-half sample period, there is no 
very significant momentum effect in this sub-sample period. Besides, long-term reversal 
effect is more significant when holding length is longer than 36 months. Comparing the 
three strategies, strategy JT does the worst in term of profits eaming of self-financing 
portfolio. Besides, it shows reversal effect earlier than the other strategies. 
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Table 5.1 Results for the General Stock Market 
This table reports the average monthly retums for portfolios constructed by using JT, GHH and 
GHL approaches. Portfolios of JT approach are formed based on 12-month lagged retums and 
held for K months. The sell portfolio of JT approach is the equally weighted portfolio of 
one-third ofthe stocks with the lowest continuously compounded returns over the previous 12 
months, the buy portfolio is the equally weighted portfolio of the one-third of the stocks with 
the highest continuously compounded retums, and the buy-sell portfolio is the zero-cost 
portfolio by longing the buy portfolio and shorting the sell portfolio. Portfolios of GHH 
approach are formed based on the ratio ofcurrent price to the highest price achieved within the 
previous l2 months and held for K month. The buy (sell) portfolio of GHH approach is the 
equally weighted portfolio ofone-third of stocks with the highest (lowest) ratio of current price 
to the 12-month highest price, and the buy-sell portfolio is the zero-cost portfolio by longing the 
buy portfolio and shorting the sell portfolio. Portfolios of GHL approach are formed based on 
the ratio ofcurrent price to the lowest price achieved within the previous 12 months and held for 
K month. The buy (sell) portfolio is the equally weighted portfolio of one-third of stocks with 
the highest (lowest) ratio of current price to the 12-month lowest price, and the buy-sell 
portfolio is the zero-cost portfolio by longing the buy portfolio and shorting the sell portfolio. 
The t statistic is for the null hypothesis that the average monthly retums of the zero-cost 
portfolios are not significantly different from 0. Besides the whole sample period, January 1973 
to December 1990, each panel also reports results for subperiods, January 1973 to December 
1990 and January 1991 to December 2008. 
PanelA. Results ofthe Whole Sample Period: 1973 - 2008 
Approach K= 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
JT Sell 1.15 1.19 1.27 1.35 1.41 1.43 1.46 1.46 1.41 1.43 1.45 1.46 
JT Buy 1.62 1.54 1.46 1.39 1.31 1.29 1.27 1.27 1.47 1.46 1.45 1.44 
JT Buy-sell 0.47 0.35 0.19 0.04 -0.09 -0.14 -0.18 -0.19 0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.02 
tstatist ic 2.11** 1.71* 0.98 0.22 -0.57 -0.91 -1.21 -1.31 0.3 0.13 0 -0.11 
GHH Sell 0.93 0.96 1.03 1.12 1.23 1.28 1.32 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.34 1.34 
GHH Buy 1.52 1.50 1.45 1.38 1.29 1.26 1.23 1.23 1.22 1.23 1.22 1.22 
GHH Buy-sell 0.59 0.54 0.42 0.26 0.06 -0.02 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 
t statistic 2.3** 2.l9** 1.79* 1.16 0.30 -0.10 -0.44 -0.53 -0.59 -0.58 -0.69 -0.74 
GHL SeU 1.06 1.04 1.06 1.11 1.20 1.24 1.27 1.28 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 
GHL Buy 1.43 1.43 1.38 1.32 1.24 1.21 1.19 1.19 1.20 1.22 1.22 1.22 
GHL Buy-sell 0.37 0.39 0.32 0.21 0.04 -0.03 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
t statistic 2.34** 2.74** 2.41** 1.61. 0.32 -0.32 -0.86 -0.92 -0.98 -0.77 -0.78 -0.77 
PanelB. Results o f t h e First-HatfSubsample Period: 1973-1990 
Approach K: 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
JT Sell 1.09 1.10 1.15 1.23 1.29 1.32 1.35 1.38 1.41 1.43 1.45 1.46 
JT Buy 1.74 1.70 1.67 1.62 1.55 1.53 1.51 1.50 1.47 1.46 1.45 1.44 
JT Buy-sell 0.64 0.60 0.52 0.39 0.25 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.02 
tstatistic 2.56** 2.44** 2A2** 1.63 1.11 0.92 0.76 0.56 0.3 0.13 0 -0.11 
GHH Sell 0.80 0.82 0.87 0.96 1.07 1.12 1.16 1.18 1.20 1.22 1.24 1.25 
GHH Buy 1.64 1.65 1.63 1.57 1.47 1.43 1.40 1.39 1.37 1.37 1.36 1.35 
GHH Buy-sell 0.84 0.83 0.76 0.61 0.40 0.30 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.10 
t statistic 3.59*** 3.64*** 3.39*** 2.73** 1.88* 1.46 1.19 1.10 0.92 0.85 0.67 0.57 
GHL Sell 1.10 1.07 1.08 1.12 1.21 1.24 1.28 1.29 1.32 1.33 1.34 1.35 
GHL Buy 1.38 1.40 1.38 1.34 1.27 1.24 1.23 1.23 1.22 1.23 1.23 1.23 
GHL Buy-sell 0.28 0.33 0.30 0.22 0.06 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 
t statistic 1.74* 2.17** 2.Q7** 1.56 0.45 -0.02 -0.46 -0.64 -1.06 -1.06 -1.26 -1.34 
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Panel C. Results ofthe Second-HatfSubsample Period: 1991-2008 
Approach K= 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
jT SeU 1.20 1.28 1.38 1.46 1.52 1.54 1.56 1.54 1.51 1.48 1.48 1.48 
JT Buy 1.50 1.37 1.25 1.16 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.05 1.08 1.11 1.11 1.11 
JT Buy-seU 0.30 0.10 -0.14 -0.30 -0.44 -0.48 -0.52 -0.50 -0.42 -0.38 -0.37 -0.37 
t s ta t i s t ic 0.82 0.31 -0.47 -1.14 -1.81* -2.14** -2.49** -149** -2.25** -2.13** -2.24** -2.39** 
GHH Sell 1.05 1.09 1.19 1.28 1.39 1.43 1.47 1.47 1.46 1.44 1.44 1.44 
GHH Buy 1.39 1.35 1.27 1.19 1.11 1.09 1.06 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.09 
GHH Buy-sell 0.34 0.26 0.09 -0.09 -0.28 -0.34 -0.41 -0.41 -0.39 -0.36 -0.36 -0.35 
t s ta t i s t ic 0.74 0.59 0.21 -0.24 -0.76 -0.99 -1.22 -1.26 -1.23 -1.17 -1.20 -1.20 
GHL Sell 1.03 1.00 1.04 1.11 1.20 1.24 1.27 1.26 1.25 1.24 1.24 1.24 
GHL Buy 1.49 1.45 1.38 1.30 1.22 1.17 1.15 1.16 1.18 1.21 1.22 1.22 
GHL Buy-seU 0.46 0.45 0.34 0.19 0.02 -0.07 -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
t s ta t i s t ic 1.69* 1.87* 1.52 0.9 0.1 -0.36 -0.72 -0.68 -0.47 -0.24 -0.16 -0.11 
* Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
** Significant at the 5% level for a two-tailed T-test. 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.1 .2 SEASONALITY 
Previous chapter documents significant seasonality phenomena in retums of loser 
portfolios generated by JT and GHH trading strategies. However, there is no significant 
seasonality in strategy GHL. In this section, I investigate whether the retums ofgeneral 
market show seasonality. Ifi t is, whether there is any difference among the three trading 
strategies. 
Table 5.2 presents the result o fmy investigation. In panel A, it shows evidence of 
strategy JT with 12-month formation period. It shows that the average retums for 
winner and loser portfolios in January are significantly higher than the average retums 
of non-January months. Besides, the loser portfolio performs much better than the 
winner portfolio in January. Though the winner portfolio outperforms the loser portfolio 
in non-January months for the first 12 months of the holding period, the difference 
between winner and loser portfolio in non-January month is diminishing as the holding 
length increases. Interestingly, the retums of winner and loser portfolios in January do 
not fluctuate a lot for the different holding period, while retums of non-January months 
converge to each other as the holding period extends. 
Panel B shows the results of strategy GHH of 12-month formation period. Though 
portfolios of strategy JT and strategy GHH formed based on different criterion, they 
show seasonality in a similar pattern. Both of the winner and loser portfolios perform 
better in January than their average retums of non-January months, and the loser 
portfolio outperforms the winner portfolio in January. Though returns of winner and 
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loser portfolios in non-January month increase and decrease respectively as the holding 
length increases，retums of January do not change a lot for both the winner and loser 
portfolios. It seems that the January effect ofthe loser portfolio constitutes a big portion 
in the retum reversal ofwinner and loser portfolios. Without the significant increase of 
loser portfolio in January, the momentum strategy can eam profits for a much longer 
holding period. 
Panel C presents the result from strategy GHL with 12-month formation period. 
Unlike the results of previous strategies, January effect in strategy GHL is not 
significant at all. Though both the winner and loser portfolios show great increase in 
January, the loser portfolio does not outperform the winner portfolio. For some 
strategies, such as GHL(12,12) for the whole sample period, the winner portfolio 
performs better than the loser portfolio. For non-January months, similar to the JT and 
GHL strategies, retums of the winner portfolio decrease and retums of the loser 
portfolio increases as the holding lengths become longer. 
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Table 5.2 Seasonality for the General Stock Market 
This table reports the average monthly portfolio returns for January as well as non-January 
months of JT, GHH and GHL strategies. In panel A, the portfolios are formed based on 
continuously compounded retums over the previous 12 months and held for K months. In panel 
B (C), the portfolios are formed based on the ratio of current price to the highest (lowest) price 
achieved within the previous 12 months and held K months. See Table 5.1 for a description of 
portfolio construction. The t statistic is for the null hypothesis that the average monthly retums 
of the zero-cost portfolios are not significantly different from 0. Besides the whole sample 
period, January 1973 to December 1990, each panel also reports results for subperiods, January 
1973 to December 1990 and January 1991 to December 2008. 
. K = 3 T " 9 i 2 
Period Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat Buv SeU B-S tstat 
73-08 Jan 475 10.39 -5.64 4.06 * 4.75 10.32 -5.57 4.89 * 4.73 10.40 -5.67 -5.66 * 4.69 10.36 -5.67 -6.30 * 
Feb-Dec 1.34 0.32 1.01 5.47 * 1.25 0.37 0.88 5.05 * 1.16 0.45 0.71 4.36 * 1.09 0.54 0.55 3.56 * 
AU 162 1 15 0.47 2.11 * 1.54 1.19 0.35 1.71 * 1.46 1.27 0.19 0.98 1.39 1.35 0.04 0.22 
73-90 Jan 5.74 10.99 -5.25 -3.35 * 5.65 11.05 -5.40 -3.65 * 5.65 11.23 -5.58 -3.81 * 5.58 11.25 -5.67 -3.98 * 
Feb-Dec 138 0.23 1.16 5.81 * 1.35 0.23 1.13 5.76 * 1.32 0.27 1.05 5.53 * 1.27 0.35 0.92 4.92 * 
AU 174 1 09 0.64 2.56 * 1.70 1.10 0.60 2.44 * 1.67 1.15 0.52 2.12 * 1.62 1.23 0.39 1.63 
91-08 Jan 3.81 9.82 -6.01 -2.61 * 3.90 9.63 -5.73 -3.26 * 3.87 9.62 -5.75 4.08 * 3.86 9.52 -5.66 4.89 * 
Feb-Dec 1.29 0.42 0.87 2.81 * 1.15 0.52 0.63 2.21 * 1.01 0.64 0.38 1.44 0.91 0.73 0.18 0.76 
AU 1 50 120 0.30 0.82 1.37 1.28 0.10 0.31 1.25 1.38 -0.14 AA1 1.16 1.46 -0.30 -1.14 
K= 24 36 48 60 
Period Buv SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat 
73-08 Jan 466 10.19 -5.53 ^.30 * 4.75 9.87 -5.12 -5.81 * 4.84 9.53 4.69 -5.42 * 4.92 9.26 4.35 -5.23 * 
Feb-Dec 099 0.65 0.34 2.60 * 0.96 0.71 0.25 2.16 * 0.96 0.74 0.23 2.15 * 0.95 0.78 0.17 1.75 * 
AU 1 4 3 1 29 -0 14 -0.91 1.46 1.27 -0.19 -1.31 1.43 1.46 0.03 0.13 1.46 1.44 -0.02 -0.11 
73-90 Jan 0 06 0.11 -0.05 -3.95 * 0.06 0.11 -0.05 -3.63 * 0.06 0.11 -0.05 -3.39 * 0.06 0.10 -0.04 -3.20 * 
Feb-Dec 0.01 0.00 0.01 4.06 * 0.01 0.01 O.Oi 3.42 * 0.01 0.01 0.00 2.77 * 0.01 0.01 0.00 2.38 * 
AU 132 153 0.20 0.92 1.38 1.50 0.12 0.56 1.43 1.46 0.03 0.13 1.46 1.44 -0.02 -0.11 
91-08 Jan 362 9.32 -5.69 4.88 * 3.66 8.93 -5.27 4.52 * 3.81 8.50 4.70 4.25 * 3.90 8.14 4.24 4.32 * 
Feb-Dec 0 83 0.84 -0.01 -0.05 0.81 0.87 -0.06 -0.39 0.86 0.84 0.02 0.11 * 0.85 0.87 -0.02 >0.18 
AU 1.54 1.06 -0.48 -2.14 * 1.54 1.05 -0.50 -2.49 * 1.48 1.11 -0.38 -2.13 * 1.48 1.11 -0.37 -2.39 * 
Panel B. Returns of Strategy GHH for General StockMarket 
~ " ~ ^ 3 6 9 n 
Penod Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat 
73-08 Jan 3 52 1062 -7.09 4.18 * 3.59 10.50 -6.91 4.28 * 3.61 10.47 4.86 4.61 * 3.61 10.48 ^.87 -5.33 * 
Feb-Dec 1.34 0.05 1.29 6.38 * 1.31 0.09 1.22 6.27 * 1.25 0.17 1.08 5.83 * 1.18 0.27 0.91 5.06 * 
AU 1.52 0.93 0.59 2.30 * 1.50 0.96 0.54 2.19 * 1.45 1.03 0.42 1.79 * 1.38 1.12 0.26 1.16 
73-90 Jan 4 95 10 14 -5.20 -3.71 * 4.99 10.08 -5.09 -3.86 * 4.97 10.17 -5.20 4.11 * 4.82 10.35 -5.53 4.46 * 
Feb-Dec 1.34 -0.05 1.39 7.77 * 1.35 -0.02 1.36 7.85 * 1.33 0.03 1.30 7.64 * 1.27 0.10 1.17 6.99 * 
AU 1.64 0.80 0.84 3.59 * 1.65 0.82 0.83 3.64 * 1.63 0.87 0.76 3.39 * 1.57 0.96 0.61 2.73 * 
91-08 Jan 2.10 11.09 -8.99 -2.92 * 2.19 10.93 -8.74 -2.98 * 2.24 10.77 -8.52 -3.18 * 2.39 10.61 -8.22 -3.64 * 
Feb-Dec 1 33 0.14 1.19 3.27 * 1.27 0.20 1.08 3.09 * 1.18 0.31 0.87 2.63 * 1.08 0.44 0.65 2.04 * 
AU 1.39 1.05 0.34 0.74 1.35 1.09 0.26 0.59 1.27 1.19 0.09 0.21 1.19 1.28 -0.09 -0.24 
K= 24 36 48 60 
P — d Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat Buy SeU B-S tstat 
73-08 Jan 3.62 10.29 -6.68 -5.97 * 3.74 9.91 -6.17 -5.91 * 3.86 9.55 -5.69 -5.69 * 3.94 9.24 -5.30 -5.68 * 
Feb-Dec 1.04 0.46 0.58 3.50 * 1.00 0,55 0.45 2.87 * 0.99 0.58 0.40 2.71 * 0.97 0.63 0.35 2.46 * 
AU 1.28 1.26 -0.02 -0.10 1.33 1.23 -0.10 -0,53 1.33 1.23 -0.10 -0.58 1.34 1,22 -0.12 -0.74 
73-90 Jan 4.78 10.31 -5.53 4.63 * 4.94 10.01 -5.07 4.77 * 5.08 9.74 4.67 4.85 * 5.13 9.52 4.38 4.84 * 
Feb-Dec 1.12 0.29 0.83 5.51 * 1.07 0.38 0.69 4.77 * 1.03 0.44 0.59 4.25 * 1.00 0.50 0.50 3.70 * 
AU 1.12 1.43 0.30 1.46 1.18 1.39 0.21 1.10 1.22 1.37 0.15 0.85 1.25 1.35 0.10 0.57 
91-08 Jan 2.45 10.27 -7.82 -4.14 * 2.54 9.81 -7.26 4.05 * 2.65 9.36 -6.71 -3.83 * 2.74 8.95 -6.21 -3.81 * 
Feb-Dec 0.97 0.63 0.34 1.13 0.93 0.72 0.21 0.76 0.94 0.72 0.22 0.82 0.94 0.75 0.19 0.76 
AU 1.43 1.09 -0.34 -0.99 1.47 1.06 -0.41 -1.26 1.44 1.08 -0.36 -1.17 1.44 1.09 -0.35 -1.20 
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Panel C. Returns ofS t ra tegy GHL for General Stock Market 
D . ,K= 3 6 9 n 
Penod Buy Sell B-S tstat Buv Sell B-S tstat Buv Sell B-S tstat Buv Sell B-S tstat 
73-08 Jan 6 82 7.03 -0,21 -0.24 6.93 6.82 0.12 0.18 7.04 6.68 0.36 0.73 7.02 6.67 0.35 0.77 
Feb-D.0 95 0.52 0.42 2.76 * 0.93 0.51 0.41 2.87 * 0.86 0.55 0.31 2.30 * 0.80 0.61 0.19 1.45 
All 1 43 1 06 0.37 2.34 * 1.43 1.04 0.39 2.74 * 1.38 1.06 0.32 2.41 * 1.32 1.11 0.21 1.61 
73-90 Jan 7 28 7.86 -0.57 -0.71 7.39 7.73 -0.35 -0.49 7.45 7.62 -0.17 -0.26 7.33 7.72 -0.39 -0.60 
Feb-D,0 84 0.48 0.36 2.24 * 0.86 0.47 0.39 2.57 * 0.83 0.49 0.34 2.34 * 0.80 0.52 0.27 1.95 * 
All 1 38 1 10 0.28 1.74 * 1.40 1.07 0.33 2.17 * 1.38 1.08 0.30 2.07 * 1.34 1.12 0.22 1.56 
91-08 Jan 6.35 6.20 0.15 0.10 6.48 5.90 0.58 0.54 6.63 5.73 0.90 1.20 6.71 5.62 1.09 1.77 * 
Feb-D,1 05 0.56 0.49 1.86 * 1.00 0.56 0.44 1.79 * 0.90 0.61 0.29 1.23 0.81 0.70 0.11 0.49 
All 1 49 1 03 0 46 1.69 1.45 1.00 0.45 1.87 * 1.38 1 . 0 4 0.34 1.52 1.30 1.11 0.19 0 . 9 0 _ 
^ ^ 36 48 60 
Penod Buy Sell B-S tstat Buy Sell B-S tstat Buv Sell B-S tstat Buy Sell B-S tstat 
73-08 Jan 6 9 0 6 74 0.16 0 . 3 8 ~ ~ 6 . 9 3 6.59 0.34 0 . 8 9 ~ ~ 6 . 9 6 6.41 0.55 1.60 6.97 6.22 0.76 2.14 * 
Feb-D 0 69 0.74 -0.05 -0.47 0,67 0.80 -0.13 -1.29 0.69 0.82 -0.13 -1.35 0.70 0.85 -0.14 -1.56 
All 1 24 1 21 -0.03 -0.32 1.28 1.19 -0.09 -0.92 1.29 1.22 -0.07 -0.77 1.29 1.22 -0.07 -0.77 
73-90 Jan 7.26 7.81 -0.55 -1.12 7.38 7.67 -0.29 -0.70 7.44 7.49 -0.05 -0.13 7.47 7.33 0.14 0.41 
Feb-D,069 0.65 0.05 0.40 0.67 0.72 -0.05 -0.43 0.66 0.77 -0.11 -1.08 0.66 0.80 -0.15 -1.54 
All 1 24 1 24 0 00 -0.02 1.29 1.23 -0.07 -0.64 1.33 1.23 -0.10 -1.06 1.35 1.23 -0.12 -1.34 
91-08 Jan 6.54 5.66 0.88 1.28 6.49 5.52 0.97 1.57 6.47 5.32 1.15 2.08 * 6.47 5.10 1.37 2.31 * 
Feb-D 0 69 0.84 -0.15 -0.81 0.67 0.88 -0.21 -1.26 0.73 0.87 -0.14 -0.92 0.75 0.89 -0.14 -0.90 
All 1.24 1.17 -0 .07 -0.36 1.26 1.16 -0.11 -0.68 1.24 1.21 -0 .04 -0 .24 1.24 1.22 -0 .02 - 0 . 1 1 _ 
* Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
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5.2 TOURISM INDUSTRY VS. GENERAL MARKET 
In previous sections, we examined the momentum and reversal effects in the settings of 
tourism industry and the general stock market respectively. It shows that in both 
samples, former winner stocks outperform former loser stocks in the short and 
medium-term, yet in the long-term, former losers do better than the former winners, 
showing a reversal phenomenon. In this section, I compare and contrast results from the 
tourism and market sample to see how the tourism industry performs relative to the 
general market in terms of retum persistence and reversal. 
Comparing results from tourism industry and the general market, I find the 
following similarities and difference between the two samples. 
- T h o u g h both the tourism industry and the general market show retum momentum 
and reversal, momentum effect for the tourism stocks is much more significant than 
the one of the general stock markets. It shows that the self-financing portfolios of 
the tourism industry eam significant positive profits till 24 months for the whole 
sample period, regardless the trading strategies. However, for the general stock 
market, the self-financing portfolios can eam positive profits only within 12 months, 
and many of the profits are not very significant. On the other hand, the reversal 
effect for the general market seems to be stronger than the one of tourism industry, 
that the sell portfolio outperforms the buy portfolios for most strategies with holding 
length longer than 12 months. 
- I t shows that the self-financing portfolio of tourism industry is more profitable than 
the general market regardless the trading strategies used. For example, the profit of 
JT(12,6), GHH(12,6) and GHL(12,6) are 0.86%, 0.92%, and 0.42% respectively, 
their counterparts for the general market are 0.35%, 0.54 and 0.39%. It shows that 
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almost all trading strategies with holding months less than 60 months are more 
profitable for tourism industry than the general stock market. 
- F o r the subsample period investigation, it shows that the retums of general market 
show strong momentum effect in the first-half subsample period: 1973-1990. 
Regardless the trading methods used, self-financing portfolios can eam positive 
profits in most of the strategies. The profits are quite significant when holding 
length is less than 12 months. For holding period more than 12 months, the profits 
are still positive yet not very significant. However, for the second-half subsample 
period: 1991-2008, the reversal effect dominates the momentum effect for the 
general market. The profits self-financing portfolios are not very significant even for 
strategies with holding months less than 12 months. For strategies with holding 
months more than 12 months, the sell portfolios perform better than the buy 
portfolio, resulting negative profits of self-financing portfolios. However, for the 
tourism industry, such significant differences between the two sub-sample periods 
do not exist. For the JT and GHH strategies, retums of the tourism industry perform 
more or less the same in the two sub-sample periods. Former winner stocks 
continuously perform better than the former stocks and such dominance can persist 
for quite a long time，at least 12 months. Also, for strategies with holding lengths 
longer than 36 months, the self-financing portfolio eams more profits in the 
second-halfperiods than the first-halfperiods. For the GHL strategy, quite different 
from the one in the general stock market, GHL show strong momentum effect in the 
second-half sub-period, yet significant reversal effect in the first-half sub-period. 
Form the result, it shows that GHL strategy with holding length less than 24 months 
earns significant positive profits in the year 1991 to 2008. However, in the year 
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1973-1990, profits are not very significant for the holding length less than 24 
months and tum negative for the holding length greater than 24 months. 
- I n terms ofthe seasonality, the tourism industry and the general stock market show 
similar patterns. For the JT and GHH strategies, both of the winner and loser 
portfolios increase significantly in January and earn higher retums than the 
non-January months. Besides, the loser portfolio outperforms the winner portfolio in 
January with a very significant level. However, for the GHH strategy, both the 
samples do not show January seasonality. Though winner and loser portfolio do 
much better in January than in non-January months, the differences between winner 
and loser portfolio are not significant. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXPLAEVmG THE MOMENTUM AND REVERSAL EFFECT： 
CAPITALASSET PRICING MODEL 
Starting from this chapter, I try to explain the momentum and reversal effects in 
tourism stock recorded in the last chapters. Firstly, I want to investigate whether such 
effects can be explained within the framework of rational asset pricing. If i t is not, I will 
tum to solutions derived from irrational investing behavior, such as overreaction of 
investors. Past literature also exerts great effort in explaining price anomalies by using 
rational asset pricing models. In the work ofFama and French (1996), the authors show 
with evidence that many ofthe CAPM average-return anomalies are related and most of 
them are captured by the three-factor model in Fama and French (1993). The model 
advances that the expected retum on a portfolio in excess ofthe risk-free rate [E(Ri)-Rf] 
is explained by the sensitivity of its retum to three factors: (i) the excess retum on a 
broad market portfolio (RM-Rf); 00 the difference between the retum on a portfolio of 
small stocks and the retum on a portfolio of large stocks (SMB, small minus big); and 
(iii) the difference between the retum on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and 
the retum on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low).This 
model is based on and develops the traditional model of CAPM, which explains the 
cross-sectional difference of stock retums only use p. The three factors model adds two 
more explanatory variables to the CAPM model, in order to explain retum covariation 
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compensated in average retums yet not captured by market betas. In this chapter, I first 
describe the three-factor model in details and then uses it to explain the momentum and 
reversal effects in my sample. 
6.1 CAPM AND THREE-FACTOR MODEL 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of William Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner 
(1965) marks the birth of asset pricing theory. It is the cornerstone of university 
investment studies and is widely used in applications, such as estimating the cost of 
capital for firms and evaluating the performance of managed portfolios, for the past four 
decades. The most appealing advantage of CAPM is that it provides powerful and 
intuitively pleasing predictions about how to measure risk and how to relate risk to 
expected retum. 
Harry Markowitz is recognized as the father of modern portfolio theory (MPT). His 
major contribution is to "found the field of finance awash in the imprecision ofEnglish 
and left it with scientific precision and insight made possible only by mathematics" 
(Rubinstein, 2002). In his work Markowitz (1952), Markowitz developed the model of 
portfolio choice, where investors select portfolios at time t-1 that produce stochastic 
retums at t. The model assumes that investors are risk averse and, when choosing 
among portfolios, they care only about the mean and variance of their one-period 
investment retum. In the simplified two-variable world, investors, as a result, choose 
“mean-variance-efficient，，portfolios that minimize the variance of portfolio return, 
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given expected retum, and maximize expected retum, given variance. 
In 1960s, "by standing on the shoulders of giants”，Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965) developed the CAPM which tums Markowitz's algebraic condition of 
mean-variance-efFicient into a testable prediction about the relation between risk and 
expected retum by identifying a portfolio that must be efficient if asset prices are to 
clear the market ofall assets. Based on the "mean-variance model", Sharpe and Lintner 
add two essential assumptions: 1) complete agreement- given market clearing prices at 
t-l, investors agree on the joint distribution of asset retums from t-1 to t, and 2) there is 
borrowing and lending at a risk-free rated, which is the same for all investors and does 
not depend on the amount borrowed or lent. The above assumptions identify a portfolio 
that must be mean-variance efficient. 
Figure 6.1 tells the story of CAPM. The horizontal axis shows portfolio risk, 
measured by the standard deviation of portfolio retum, and the vertical axis shows 
expected retum. Consider all portfolios ofrisky assets only. These portfolios decide all 
possible combinations of mean and standard deviation. In (mean, standard 
deviation)-space, a parabola form typically forms the boundary of these combinations. 
The upper left boundary constitutes the efficient frontierfor risky assets. For any point 
on the frontier, there is some portfolio that achieves this combination of mean and 
standard deviation and no other portfolio can obtain either the same mean with lower 
standard deviation, or the same standard deviation with higher mean. Such portfolios 









































































































































Adding risk-free borrowing and lending tums the efficient set into a straight line. 
Now, the efficient frontierfor all assets (including all risky and risk-free assets) is the 
line tangent to the frontier for risky assets and pass the point (0, risk-free rate ofretum) 
for the risk-free asset. As a result, there arises Tobin,s (1958) "separation theorem" that 
all efficient portfolios are combinations ofthe risk-free asset (either risk-free borrowing 
or lending) and a single risky tangency portfolio, T. 
The Sharpe-Lintner CAPM then follows. With the first assumption that investors 
have complete agreement about distributions of retums, all investors see the same 
opportunity set of combining risky tangency portfolio T with risk-free asset. Since all 
investors hold the exactly same portfolio T of risky assets, it must be the value weighted 
market portfolio of risky assets. Furthermore, each risky asset's weight in market 
portfolio M must be the total market value of all outstanding units of the asset divided 
by the total market value ofall risky assets. In addition, the risk-free rate must be set to 
clear the market for risk-free borrowing and lending. As the market portfolio M must be 
on the efficient frontier ifthe asset market is to clear, the algebraic relation holding for 
any minimum variance portfolio must hold for the market portfolio. Thus, the following 
mathematic representation can be derived, 
E(Rd:E(RzM) + [E(RM) -EiRzAd3iM, i- 1,..., N. 
In this equation, E{Ri) is the expected retum on asset /, E{RzuX the expected return 
on assets that are uncorrelated with the market returns, E(RzM), the expected return on 
market portfolio, and p,M, the market beta of asset i, is the covariance of its return with 
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the market retum divided by the variance of the market retum, 
二 c^viRjMM} 
^^^~ 。气及财）. 
Since the market beta ofasset i is also the slope in the regression ofits retum on the 
market retum, the beta can be interpreted as the measure of the sensitivity ofthe asset's 
retum to variation in the market retum. Also, another interpretation is that P/Mis the 
covariance risk ofasset i in Mmeasured relative to the average covariance risk ofassets, 
which is just the variance ofthe market retum. 
With the second assumption ofrisk-free borrowing and lending, the expected retum 
on assets that are uncorrelated with the market retum, E{RzM), must be the risk-free rate, 
Rf. The relation between expected retum and beta then becomes the familiar 
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM equation, 
E(Ri)=Rf+ [E(RM) -Rf3iM, i= l,...,N. 
In words, the expected retum on any asset i is the risk-free interest Rf, plus a risk 
premium, which is the asset's market beta, p,M, times the premium per unit ofbeta risk, 
E(RM)-Rf. 
However, unrestricted risk-free borrowing and lending is an unrealistic assumption. 
Thus, Fischer Black (1972) develops a version of the CAPM by assuming unrestricted 
short selling ofrisky assets is allowed. Under this assumption, the key CAPM result that 
the market portfolio is mean-variance-efficient can be obtained. In this version of 
CAPM, investors select portfolios along the mean-variance-efficient frontier. Market 
clearing prices imply that when one weights the efficient portfolios chosen by investors 
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by their shares of aggregate invested wealth, the resulting portfolio is the market 
portfolio. Thus, the market portfolio is a portfolio of the efficient portfolios chosen by 
investors. Under the assumption of unrestricted short selling of risky assets, portfolios 
made up of efficient portfolios are themselves efficient. Therefore, the market portfolio 
is efficient, which means that the minimum variance condition for M given above holds. 
Therefore, the Black version CAPM equation can be written as, 
E(Rd=E(Rs) + [E(RM)-E(RBmM, i= l,...,N. 
Where E(Rs) is the expected retum on assets uncorrelated with the market. According to 
Black version, E(Rs) must be less than the expected market retum, thus the risk 
premium for beta is positive. Unfortunately, unrestricted short selling is as unrealistic as 
unrestricted risk-free borrowing and lending. Without those assumptions, portfolios 
made up of efficient portfolios are not typically efficient according to algebra of 
portfolio efficiency. Thus, the market portfolio, which is made up by efficient portfolios 
is not typically efficient and the CAPM relation between expected retum and market 
beta is lost. 
In the early stage, scholars mainly test implications based on the CAPM in the 
following directions 1) expected retums on all assets are linearly related to their betas, 
and no other variable has marginal explanatory power; 2) the beta premium is positive, 
meaning that the expected retum on the market portfolio exceeds the expected retum on 
assets whose retums are uncorrelated with the market retum; 3) in the Sharpet-Lintner 
version ofthe model, assets uncorrelated with the market have expected retums equal to 
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the risk-free rate, and the beta premium is the expected market retum minus the 
risk-free rate. 
For empirically testing, cross-section regression and time-series regress are the 
major tools. The cross-section regression is conducted by regressing a cross-section of 
average asset retums on estimates of assets betas. The model predicts that the intercept 
in these regressions is the risk-free interest rate, Rf, and the coefficient on beta is the 
expected retum on the market in excess of the risk free rate, E(Ru) — Rf. To improve the 
precision of estimated betas, researchers such as Blume (1970), and Black, Jensen and 
Scholes (1972), work with portfolios, rather than individual securities. The Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) propose a method for addressing the inference problem caused by 
correlation of the residuals in cross-section regressions. In their approach, rather than 
estimate a single cross-section regression of average monthly retums on betas, they 
estimate month-by-month cross-section regressions of monthly retums on betas. The 
time-series means ofthe monthly slopes and intercepts, along with the standard errors 
ofthe means, are then used to test whether the average premium for beta is positive and 
whether the average retum on assets uncorrelated with the market is equal to the 
average risk-free interest rate. The time-series regression test is proposed by Jensen 
(1968), which is based on the relation between expected retum and market beta. 
According to the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, the expected value of an asset's excess retum 
is completely explained by its expected CAPM risk premium. This implies that 
"Jensen's alpha", the intercept term in the time-series regression, 
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Rit — Rft 二 oc/ + P/M {Rut - Rfi) + s", 
is zero for each asset. 
The early tests consistently reject the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM by 
showing that the intercept is greater than the average risk-free rate Q)roxied by the 
retum on a one-month Treasury bill), and the coefficient on beta is less than the average 
excess market retum Q)roxied as the average retum on a portfolio of U.S. common 
stocks minus the Treasury bill rate). (Douglas (1968), Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), 
Miller and Scholes (1972)，Blume and Friend (1973) and Fama and MacBeth (1973)) 
However, the central predictions ofthe Black version ofthe CAPM, that market betas 
suffice to explain expected retums and that the risk premium for beta is positive, seem 
to hold. (Famma and MacBeth (1973), Gibbons (1982) and Stambaugh (1982)) The 
success ofthe Black version ofthe CAPM in early tests then makes the CAPM a good 
and popular model for the description of expected retums. 
However, starting in the late 1970s, empirical evidences accumulates that 
challenges even the Black version ofthe CAPM by showing that much ofthe variation 
in expected retum is unrelated to market beta. Researchers continuously found that 
ratios involving stock prices have information about expected retums missed by market 
betas. Basu,s (1997) made the first blow by showing evidence that when common 
stocks are sorted on earnings-price ratios, future retums on high EfP stocks are higher 
than predicted by the CAPM. Banz (1981) finds a size effect that when stocks are sorted 
on market capitalization (pricc times shares outstanding), average retums on small 
81 
stocks are higher than predicted by the CAPM. Statman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid 
and Lanstein (1985) document that stocks with high book-to-market equity ratios (BM, 
the ratio of the book value of a common stock to its market value) have high average 
retums that cannot be fully explained by their betas. Bhandari (1988) documents that 
high debt-equity ratios (book value of debt divided by the market value of equity) are 
associated with retums that are too high relative to their market betas. Fama and French 
(1992 & 19%) synthesize and confirm that size, earnings-price, debt-equity and 
book-to-market ratios add to the explanation of expected stock retums provided by 
market beta, by using both the cross-section and time-series regression approach. 
Evidence from non-U.S. major markets also show that the contradictions ofthe CAPM 
associated with price ratios are not sample specific. Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok 
(1991) documents a strong relation between book-to-market equity (BM) and average 
retum for Japanese stocks. Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe (1993) observe a similar BM 
effect in four European stock markets and in Japan. Fama and French (1998) find that 
the price ratios that produce problems for the CAPM in U.S. data show up in the same 
way in the stock returns of twelve non-U.S. major markets, and they are present in 
emerging market retums. 
In Fama and French (1992), the authors document strong evidence that variables 
involving stock prices capture variation in expected retum missed by beta and estimate 
of the beta premium is not statistically significant. The logic behind the explanation 
power of ratios involving stock prices is not complex. A stock's price depends both on 
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the expected cash flows it will produce and the expected retums that discount expected 
cash flows back to the present. Therefore, the cross-section of prices has information 
about the cross-section ofexpected retums. For example, a high expected retum implies 
a high discount rate and a low price. The cross-section of stock prices is, however, 
arbitrarily affected by differences in scale. But with a judicious choice of scaling 
variable X, the ration X/P can reveal differences in the cross-section of expected stock 
retums. Such ratios are thus best candidates to expose shortcomings of asset pricing 
models. 
If betas do not suffice to explain expected returns, the market portfolio is not 
efficient, and the CAPM is dead in its tracks. There are two streams of explanations aim 
to solve the problems. On one side are the financial behavioralists. They argue that 
stocks with high ratios ofbook value to market price are typically firms that have fallen 
on bad times, whereas low B M is associated with growth firms (Lakonishok, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994; Fama and French, 1995). They think that sorting firms on 
book-to-market ratios exposes investor overreaction to good and bad times. Investors 
overextrapolated past performance, resulting in stock prices that are too high for growth 
(low B/M) firms and too low for distressed (high BM) firms. Eventually, when the 
overreaction is corrected, the result is high retums for value stocks and low retums for 
growth stocks. 
On the other hand, proponents of asset pricing model point to the need for a more 
complicated asset pricing model. In their view, many assumptions of CAPM are too 
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unrealistic, such as the assumption that investors care only about the mean and variance 
of one-period portfolio return. It is highly possible that investors also care about other 
factor influencing portfolio retums, such as labor income and future investment 
opportunities, thus a portfolio's retum variance misses important dimensions ofrisk. If 
the statement is true, market beta is not a complete description of an asset's risk, and the 
traditional CAPM should be modified to improve the results. Merton,s (1973) 
intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) derived to improve the old CAPM. 
The ICAPM assumes that investors care not only with their end-of-period payoff, but 
also with the opportunities they will have to consume or invest the payoff. Therefore, 
when choosing a portfolio at time t-l, ICAPM investors consider how their wealth at t 
might vary with future state variables, including labor income, the prices of 
consumption goods and the nature ofportfolio opportunities at t, and expectations about 
the labor income, consumption and investment opportunities to be available after t. As a 
result, optimal portfolios are "multifactor efficient,，，which means that they have largest 
possible expected retums, given their retum variances and the covariances of their 
retums with the relevant state variables. Moreover, multifactor efficiency implies a 
relation between expected retum and beta risks, not only a market but also additional 
betas. 
One ofthe most essential elements in implementing ICAPM is to identify the state 
variables that affect expected retums. However this is not an easy case. Scholars, such 
as Fama and French (1993) take a more indirect approach to approaching the state 
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variables. They propose that though size and book-to-market equity are not themselves 
state variables, the higher average retums on small stocks and high book-to-market 
stocks reflect unidentified state variables that produce undiversifiable risks (covariances) 
in retums that are not captured by the market retum and are priced separately from 
market betas. They show evidence that the retums on the stocks of small firms covary 
more with one another than with retums on the stocks of large firms, and retums on 
high book-to-market (value) stocks covary more with one another than with retums on 
low book-to-market (growth) stocks. Based on what they found, they propose a 
three-factor model for expected retums, 
E(Ru) — Rft = P/M [E{RM^) — Rft] + P/. E(SMBd +p.7. E(HMLd. 
Here, SMBt (small minus big) is the difference between the retums on diversified 
portfolios of small and big stocks, HMLt (high minus low)is the difference between the 
retums on diversified portfolios ofhigh and low B/M stocks, and the betas are slopes in 
the multiple regressions ofRu - Rft on Rut _ Rft, SMBt and HMLt. One implication ofthe 
expected retum equation of the three-factor model is that the intercept a, in the 
time-series regression, 
Ru - Rft = a/ + P/M {RMt - Rfd + P/5 SMBt +p//. HMLt + 〜， 
is zero for all assets i. Using this criterion, Fama and French (1993, 1996) find that the 
model captures much of the variation in average retum for portfolios formed on size, 
book-to-market equity and other price ratios that cause problems for the CAPM. 
From a theoretical view, the main shortcoming of the three-factor model is that the 
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SMB and HML explanatory retums are not motivated by predictions about state 
variables of concern to investors, instead, they are brute force constructs meant to 
capture the patterns uncovered by previous work on how average stock retums vary 
with size and the book-to-market equity ratio. However, this concern is not fatal as the 
ICAPM does not require that the additional portfolios used along with the market 
portfolio to explain expected retums "mimic" the relevant state variables. 
6.2 EVIDENCE FROM TOURISM STOCKS 
In their work Fama and French (1996), the authors argue that the three-factor model can 
captures the reversal of long-term past retums documented by DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985). They found that stocks with low long-term past retums (losers) tend to be 
smaller and relatively distressed and have positive SMB and HML slopes and higher 
future average retums. Conversely, long-term winners tend to be strong stocks that have 
negative slopes on HML and low future returns. However, the three-factor model cannot 
explain the continuation of short-term retums documented by Jegadeesh and 
Titman(1993), as stocks with low short-term past retums also load positively on HML 
and short-term past winners load negatively on HML. In this section, I investigate 
whether the three-factor model can explain the momentum and reversal effects of 
tourism stocks. 
Table 6.1 shows the average returns of momentum portfolios in the t-month after 
portfolio formation and three-factor regressions for monthly excess retums. Panel A 
presents the result by strategy JT, where portfolios are formed based on previous 
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12-month retums. The results confirm the strong continuation ofshort-term retums. The 
average excess retum for the third month after portfolio formation is 0.49% for the sell 
(loser) portfolio, 1.07% for the middle portfolio, and 1.45% for the buy (winner) 
portfolio. However, as the holding length becomes longer, the excess retum of loser 
portfolio is increasing and the excess returns of winner portfolio is decreasing. For the 
36-month after the portfolio formation the excess retums of loser portfolio increase 
from 0.49% to 1.20%, yet the winner portfolio decrease from 1.45% to 0.95%. The 
winner portfolios do better than the loser portfolios in the first 18 months, yet such 
advantage is diminishing as the holding length become longer and finally, the loser 
portfolio exceed the winner portfolios and retum reversal effect appears. In the 
regression test, it shows that the three-factor model can explain the long-term reversal 
effects quite well. The regressions ofexcess retums on Ru-Rf, SMB, and HML produce 
intercepts that not significantly different from zero for most middle and winner 
portfolios and for loser portfolios with holding months more than 18 months. The 
three-factor model works because past losers load more on SMB and HML. Since they 
behave more like small distressed stocks, the model predicts that the long-term past 
losers will have higher average retums. However, as the result of Fama and French 
(1996), the three-factor model misses the continuation of retums. In the three-factor 
regressions, the intercepts are strongly negative for loser portfolios, though the 
intercepts for winner and middle portfolios are not significantly different from zero. The 
problem is that losers load more on SMB and HML. As the portfolios with long-term 
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holding period, the three-factor model predicts reversal for the returns of losers and 
winners, the explanation by the three-factor model misses the observed continuation. 
Panel B documents results from strategy GHH where portfolios formed based on 
the ratio ofpast retums divided by the highest price achieved in the previous 12 months. 
The result confirms the strong continuation of stock retums in the first 24 holding 
months. The average excess return for the third month after portfolio formation is 
0.40% for the sell (loser) portfolio, 0.95% for the middle portfolio, and 1.27% for the 
buy (winner) portfolio. The momentum pattem then lasts at least 24 months after the 
formation ofportfolios. Then the advantage of the winner diminishes. As the retum of 
loser portfolios increase and winner portfolio decreases, the long-term reversal occurs. 
The three-factor regression can explain the long-term reversal quite well, as the loser 
portfolios load more on the SMB and HML factors. However, it comes across the same 
problem as the one ofJT strategy that the short-term continuation cannot be captured by 
the model. 
Panel C reports the results of GHL where portfolios are formed based on the ratio 
of past retums divided by the lowest price achieved in the previous 12 months. The 
result confirms the continuation of stock retums in the first 12 holding months. For the 
sixth month after portfolio formation, the loser portfolios eam average excess return of 
0.55% and the winner portfolios eam 1.12%. The returns oflosers increase significantly 
in the first 12 months and then maintain to a level of 1%. On the other hand, the winner 
portfolios have a relatively more significant decreasing pattern throughout the observed 
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periods. However, different from the previous strategies, when it comes to the 
explanation power of three-factor model, the three-fact model seems not be able to 
predict the long-term reversal effects. For this investing strategy, the winner loads more 
on the market factor than the loser portfolios. However, there is no big difference for the 
loads on SMB and HML factors. Thus, from the view of relative distressed, we cannot 
predict the future returns of the portfolios as both the winner and loser portfolios have 
the same level of distress. If we only refer to the difference in the market factor, the 
model can explain the continuation ofthe average retums, as the winner portfolios are 
compensated with higher expected retums for its high market risk exposure. 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EXPLAmiNG THE MOMENTUM AND REVERSAL EFFECT： 
FUNDAMENTALS 
In the previous section, I try to explain the momentum and reversal effects within a 
framework ofrational asset pricing: the Three-Factor model. The result reveals that the 
three-factor model does well in explaining the excess retum, especially the reversal 
effect. However, similar with most findings in previous literature, regression results of 
tourism stocks show that this popular asset pricing models are insufficient to explain the 
anomalies, especially the short-term momentum effect (intercept of plenty loser 
portfolios are significantly different from zero). 
Two explanations can be provided to interpret the failure of rational asset pricing. 
First of all, it may imply that it is not possible to reason the momentum and reversal 
effects within the concept of rational asset pricing. Therefore, the momentum and 
reversal effects are due to irrational behavior of investors. Such explanation is first 
introduced by DeBondt and Thaler (1985), in which they argued that the reversal effect 
is due to an overreaction of market participants to company news. In line with their 
reasoning, stock investors become too optimistic in the case of current positive news, 
yet, become too pessimistic when there comes negative news. Barberis, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998) build up a learning model by assuming that actual earnings follow a 
random walk, while individuals wrongly believe that earnings either follow a steady 
“trends” or are “mean reversions". Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) 
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assume that overconfidence leads to negative long-run autocorrelations while biased 
self-attribution results in positive short-run autocorrelations. Hong and Stein (1999) 
assume that a market consists of news watchers, and momentum traders. Since 
information diffuses gradually, prices underreact in the short-run. The narve trading 
based on past price trends by momentum traders push prices ofpast winners above their 
fundamental values. When prices eventually revert to their fundamentals, trades by 
investors will finally lead to overreaction at long horizons. 
The second explanation concerns the improvement of conventional rational pricing. 
Although the three-factor model cannot explain majority of the problems, it might still 
be probable that the momentum and reversal effects occur within a framework of 
rational asset pricing. According to the ICAPM, investors consider systematic risks 
from different perspectives. Those risk factors may not be captured by the market beta 
yet influence the cross-section of stock retums. Thus, it is possible that there exist 
systematic risk determining short-term momentum and long-term reversal effects, yet 
such risks have not yet been conceptualized by state-variables in mathematic model. 
Besides，other problems existing in the nature of rational asset pricing model may 
account for the falling down oftesting the model in real word. For example, according 
to Roll(1977), CAPM has never been tested and probably never will be. Roll argues that 
the market portfolio is theoretically and empirically elusive, as it is not clear which 
assets, such as human capital, can legitimately be excluded from the market portfolio, 
and data availability is too limited to include plenty related yet not accessible assets, 
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such as some corporate information not available to public. As a consequence, 
validation ofthe CAPM and other related models are constrained to use proxies for the 
market portfolio. In this case, only the question whether the proxies are on the efficient 
frontier is tested. Therefore, by using only the proxies, not the true market portfolio, we 
leam nothing about the CAPM. 
In the following section, I investigate whether the pricing anomalies can be 
i 
interpreted by the irrational behavior ofmarket participants. One intrusive way to exam 
this claim is to relate stock retums to movements in fundamentals. Investors might 
overinterpret changes in fundamentals before the investing period. If they observe 
improvements in fundamentals for the winner portfolio, investors might interpret these 
improvements to be permanent although they are transient. Later in the investing period, 
as it tums true that those phenomena are temporary, investors adjust their expectation 
accordingly. As a result, high retum during the observation period is followed by low 
retums during the investing period. For the loser portfolio, decrease in fundamentals is 
considered to be permanent as the same. When fundamentals improve during the 
investing period investors adjust their expectation again. Therefore, low retums during 
the observation period are followed by high retum during the holding period. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, I related the observed pattem in stock 
retums to movements in an important fundamental: profits. I exam whether the 
movement in fundamentals can be related to observed overperformance and subsequent 
underperformance of winner stocks and the reverse pattem of loser stocks. Before this 
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analysis, I will present the hypothesis derived from the assumption that winner-loser 
effect is due to an overreaction to news in fundamentals. Secondly, in order to 
investigate the relationship behind cross-section difference of stocks and fundamentals, 
I reverse this question and ask whether one can use fundamental variables to distinguish 
between winner and loser stocks. 
；' I )： 
7.1 MOVEMENTS IN FUNDAMENTALS 1 
7.1.1 OVERREACTION AND UNDERREACTION HYPOTHESIS 
In this section, I investigate the relation between winner-loser effect and 
movements in fundamentals. Intuitively, the most related fundamental variables to stock 
movements are a company's reported profits and dividends. According to a rational 
pricing model, stock prices are the sum of future cash flows discounted at an 
appropriate rate. In this line, movements of stock retums reflect the market participants' 
expectation towards the future cash flow of the stock and the discount rate the investor 
requires. Generally, people make their decision based on information they get. Investors 
construct their expectation of future cash flow and appraise the discount level, for a 
certain level, based on the information they have about a company's realized 
performance, such as realized profits. The starting point for my investigation is the 
hypothesis raised by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) that the reversal effect is due to 
an overreaction to current news. Investors mistake temporary movements in 
fundamentals to be permanent. On one hand, for the winner portfolio, they observe an 
increase in fundamentals and believe that this increase is permanent. However, when the 
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improvement turns out to be transitory, investors are surprised by the following 
deterioration in fundamentals during the holding period. Then, stock prices are adjusted 
accordingly, resulting in an underperformance of winner portfolio compared to the loser 
portfolio. On the other hand, for the loser portfolio the reverse pattem occurs. Investors 
take a decline in fundamentals during the observation period to be permanent, although 
it is only transitory. The unexpected improvements then lead to a subsequent 
i| 
overperformance of the loser portfolio. The following hypothesis can be stated 
following the above reasoning. 
Fundamental Hypothesis 
I 
For the reversal effect, the movements in portfolio returns are paralleled by changes in 
fundamentals. For the winner portfolio, the return during the observation period is 
paralleled by an increase in profits. The subsequent underperformance during the 
holding period is paralleled by a decrease infundamentals. For the loserportfolio, the 
reverse pattern obtains. 
Test ofthe hypothesis is implemented in the following section. The evidence is from the 
development ofprofit, measured by retum on asset (ROA). 
7.1.2 MOVEMENT IN PROFITS 
According to the rational asset pricing theory, stock prices in an efficient capital market 
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are the sum of all future cash flows discounted at an appropriate rate. People can get 
information about a company's future from its realized profits. The conventional logic is 
that, ifacompany is running successful and earning substantial profits currently, it has a 
high potential to sustain and expand its business in the future. The profits a company 
earned currently can be used to pay back dividends to stock holders or retain for future 
development. Dividends payments can directly influence what investors eam by holding 
a stock. For the profits, when sufficient earnings are invested into assets, the company 
will be better prepared to develop their business and produce more profits in the futures. 
Thus, realized profits can be regarded as an efficient measure of fundamental 
performance as they have the advantages of abstracting information of future 
performance o fa company. In the following tests, I use retum on asset, ROA, calculated 
as the profits over the asset value, as the proxy of profit. ROA is an important indicator 
of business performance in tourism industry. Companies in tourism industry highly 
depend on asset to generate income. Compared with high-tech and financial related 
companies, firms, such as restaurants, hotels, amusement parks and airline companies 
have tremendous amount of asset and produce products or services by utilizing those 
assets. 
For the method used to explore the movements of profits, I adopt the portfolio 
method described in the previous sections yet with some modification. For the method 
used in previous sections, in the beginning of each month t, stocks are grouped based on 
their performance in the previous J months. This means that, in month t we consider 
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retums from t-J to t-1 when classifying portfolios, and in month t+1 we use retums 
t+l - j to t to do the same work. Obviously, we use some information in the formation 
period more than one time. Thus, under this reasoning line overlapping samples are 
used in the previous tests. Usually, from a view of econometric, the overlapping data 
may give rise to problems in OLS testing. However, the overlapping samples used in 
tests ofprevious sections do not bring any difficulties as the final regression variables-
I 
the average monthly retums, are themselves independent. Yet, in the following tests, as 
the development ofvariables are traced, overlapping samples will bring interdependent 
problems mentioned in Richardson and Smith (1991). To avoid such problems, for 
testing the developments of fundamentals, I use non-overlapping samples. When J=12, 
for the holding period of 60 months, the first sample period dates from 1973 to 1978. 
Within this period, the first 12 months from January to December 1973 are the 
formation period and based on the stock performance during which, portfolios are 
grouped. Later period from 1974 to 1978 is the five-year holding period. As I test for 
the performance of stocks during the holding period, the next non-overlapping sample 
period dates from 1974 to 1979. For my dataset from 1973 to 2008, there are 31 
non-overlapping samples. Non-overlapping samples of other lengths of formation 
periods are constructed in a same way. For example, when J=6, the first 
non-overlapping period is from January 1973 to June 1978, where the formation period 
is from January to June 1973 and the holding period is from July 1973 to June 1998. 
The next non-overlapping period is from July 1973 to December 1978, where the 
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formation period is from July to December 1973 and the holding period is from January 
1974 to December 1978. As the formation period is shorter, there are more 
non-overlapping samples generated in the case ofJ=6. 
Figure 7.1 to 7.3 present the evidence for retum on asset (ROA) for a holding 
period length of 60 months. ROAs are reported starting in year -2 which is two years 
before the start ofthe formation period, which is indicated by year 0. Reported onthe 
left-hand side are the mean of ROAs in the three portfolios, buy (winner), middle and 
seller (loser) portfolio (details of construction of those portfolios are presented in the 
second chapter), and the median of ROAs of those portfolios are showed on right-hand 
side. 
Figure 7.1 shows the results of strategy JT, where portfolios generated based on 
continuously compounded past retums. The figures show evidence which is largely in 
line with the hypothesis. Take the J=12 figure for example, during the period before 
holding period, changes in ROAs move in parallel with stock retums. The winner 
portfolio outperforms the loser portfolio in terms of profits over the entire period. At the 
end of the formation period, the difference between the winner and loser portfolio 
achieves its largest level which almost 10 percent. Again for the median, the evidence is 
significant, yet the pattern is smoother. If we look at the intertemporal evidence, we find 
that the spread between the performances of the portfolios in terms of ROAs widens 
almost during the entire period before holding. It has its peak at the end ofthe formation 
period. During the holding period, the pattern reverses. The maximum spread between 
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profits occurs already at the end of formation period. After the formation period, the 
performance in terms of fundamentals becomes again closer. In addition, one can 
observe that the most of the mean values are smaller than their corresponding median 
values. This implies that the distribution is skewed to the left. Extreme observations of 
small values exacerbate the development ofthe means as compared to the medians. 
For other formation periods, the "valley" patterns of the loser portfolios are clear 
and strong. For the winner portfolios, however, the pattem is weaker as the formation 
month become shorter. In the case of 3-month formation period, the ROAs of winner 
portfolios are increase during the formation period, yet in the investing period, they also 
present an increase trend. Another important founding is that the clear increase of the 
loser portfolios in ROAs is corresponding to the strong stock retum increase recorded in 
previous chapter. On the other hand, for the winner stocks, its stock returns only decline 
smoothly, just as its ROAs do. 
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Figure 7.2 Changes in ROAs for Strategy GHH 
This figure shows the changes of portfolio ROAs for a holding period length of 60 months. 
Portfolios are formed based on J-month lagged retums, where the sell (buy) portfolio is the 
equally weighted portfolio of one-third of the stocks with the lowest (highest) continuously 
compounded returns over the previous J months, and the middle portfolio contains the 
remaining stocks. ROAs are reported starting in year -2 which is two years before the start of 
the formation period, which is indicated by year 0. Reported on the left-hand side is the mean of 
ROAs in the three portfolios, and the median ofROAs are showed on the right-hand side. The 
sample period is from January 1973 to December 1990. 
M e a n o f R O A s — M e d i a n o f R O A s 
0.08 • ••.•-
0.06 T 
A • °.�7 严 : 1 ; 
0-。4 .....1：二:-:::.:^^力:-.:.:：^.晉.冗涵;:»:違— 。加 7 ^ ^^-. . . . i_. . t— 
002 ......1 厂 ^ - 0.05 ......^-'-'-^ -^ W^*':W'"::^^^ ^^  ： 二|| 
3 、 ， . . . . .-^..... Xllle 0.04 .―57^ -®"Middle 
-2_^ 0 1 2^ ,^,,.-^ 4 5 »^ _^B�v °.�3 ―…^sT—”••.••.•.' ―“ •— J ^ "^_Buy 
.^02 . .....^^*^^^^^^- .’.产 0.02 ^ \ ^ + —^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ H^J^ ---‘--•— 
Nw / 0.01 >^->H>>>^ >^^^^"**^^^^ -0.04 N^T ^^ ¥ 0 ^ ‘ ‘ ‘-"-_-_ ‘ “™"^‘ • • 
-0.06 J -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
J = 1 2 _ J ^ 
0.07 -| 
。.。6 T 一 h - 金 - A. 
0.05 ^ ‘一 _^  ' 0.06 7 �A> «.^  
_ •....腰…-風‘ ^ ^ , 3 - 0.05 - - f e ^ - . . f 遍 ~ ~ 5 = 7 7 7 ¾ -
0.03 . _ . - ' g - ~ ~ ^ ^ ~ " ~ , m ^ ‘ --a..:-m"-m.....•••..• 
0.02 ._^^iA^ V ^Sell 0.04 ——^ — ~ ^ +Sell 
0-01 • ••«•• Middle 0.03 ^^'>>X^  / * " ^ - - ^ ‘ .••.. _ 丨 
0 ‘ ‘ ‘ ^ . ^ ^ “ ^ - 醒 ^ ^»--^ ^_ X - b Buy 
-0.01 . ..‘!^ ^^ ^^ ^^—...1-..—.1^ -^.....4..—..5.... 一 Buy 0.02 ^^\^~"~^^-^ 
.0.02 .,.-__t=rs*^ ;r::^ -^――-产-— 0.01 ^ \ / 
-0.03 \ / . 
-0.04 V ° "~~~‘"•"‘~""~‘~~""‘~~~‘"""^ ‘"""^ ‘~~~‘ 
.0.05 — -2 -1 ° 1 2 3 4 5 
J = 9 J = 9 
0.05 �.�7 
�.04 :-面：..知去;...”-....;,:.q|.- 0.06 ^ ^ 、 ~ 如 《 » 羞 
0.03 --«U—«^ A-«^ jJp� 0.05 - »•.•.勢.”.‘.,«• "^-“• • •. ;|g|-.v;-HB-•..••.•.…B— 
A. / 苗.‘.. i^ ^ * 
0.02 - " T ： ^ ^ s e l l 0 . 0 4 - - ^ ^ ^ — ~ ~ "^Sel l �_°1 .’.-‘. ..». Middle o.03-^N^ » ••«•• Middle 
0 •""":~~~••"""•^ ~~~‘~~~‘ > ^ ' ^ —Buy 0.02 ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^ _ » _ »»hBuy 
- - - ^ < : : : : ; ^ ^ ^ 7 ' ' ^ ^ ^ . o . o . - Z Z 3 ^ Z Z Z : 
-0.02 V —J^ --
-0.�3 - \ ^ 0 .2 ., 0 1 2 3 4 5 
-0.04 J 
J = 6 ^ 
0,05 -| — 0.06 — 
0.04 .g... _— 0.05 --,......a<fr^"^^-*<"i,,:i^-^^^^^=<^"^i^ 
• ,...• .M. .»•••.:猶 ^ , 
0.03 、 . • . , . -；‘^^^ 0.04 .......麵…-一‘< 
0.02 ^ ^ .^ Sell *X^ ^ ~»~kll 
^ • • ^ � / m M-HHI. 0.03 *^"===^r - ~ ~ ^ ..«.. Middle 
0.01 *>^  -jf— "«•• Middle \ j^ ,.-""^  
X . ~&~ Buy 0.02 ^S ;^i^ ^ 一 - ^ Buy 
… X -1 A 1 2 >--y 5 0.01 — 
: : : t 3 ^ S j z : = = ——.T—… 
• -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 -0.03 ^ 
^ J i^^ 
101 
Figure 7.2 shows the evidence of strategy GHH where portfolios are formed based 
on the ratio ofpast retum to the highest price achieved in the previous J months. From 
the graphic result, we can see that the movement in ROAs of this portfolios show the 
similar pattern to the one in the previous investing strategy which is formed based on 
past retums. It shows that the winner portfolio outperforms the other portfolios in terms 
ofprofits over the entire period. The spread between ROAs widens from the two years 
before the formation period to the end of formation period. Yet, during the holding 
period, ROAs of the two portfolios become closer again. Though the two extreme 
portfolios show clear pattem in their movements, the middle portfolios behave 
relatively stable, as it has no strong fluctuation during the entire process. Also similar to 
the one in the previous strategy, the movements in the winner portfolio are not as strong 
and clear as the one of loser portfolios. Recall the stock retum movements recorded in 
the second chapter, we can recognize the similarity between the changes in stock retums 
and changes in ROAs: during the holding period, the magnitude of increase in the loser 
portfolios is much stronger than the one of decrease in the winner stocks. 
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Figure 7.2 Changes in ROAs for Strategy GHH 
This figure shows the changes of portfolio ROAs for a holding period length of 60 months. 
Portfolios are formed based on the ratio ofcurrent price to the highest price achieved within the 
previous J months, where the buy (sell) portfolio is the equally weighted portfolio ofone-third 
of stocks with the highest (lowest) ratio of current price to the J-month highest price, and the 
middle portfolio contains the remaining stocks. ROAs are reported starting in year -2 which is 
two years before the start ofthe formation period, which is indicated by year 0. Reported on the 
left-hand side is the mean ofROAs in the three portfolios, and the median ofROAs are showed 
on the right-hand side. The sample period is from January 1973 to December 1990. 
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Figure 7.3 shows the evidence of strategy GHL where portfolios are formed based 
on the ratio ofpast retum to the lowest price achieved in the previous J months. Similar 
to the other two strategies, the loser portfolios in this strategy also shows obvious and 
clear "valley" shape pattern that the ROAs of loser portfolio declines dramatically from 
the two years before the formation period to the end of formation period and then has 
significant improvement in the holding period. Yet the winner portfolio also shows 
weaker reverse pattern: though the winner portfolios show clear increase trend in the 
pre-holding period, yet they rarely show declining trend in the holding period. 
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Figure 7.2 Changes in ROAs for Strategy GHH 
This figure shows the changes of portfolio ROAs for a holding period length of 60 months. 
Portfolios are formed based on the ratio ofcurrent price to the lowest price achieved within the 
previous J months, where the buy (sell) portfolio is the equally weighted portfolio ofone-third 
of stocks with the highest (lowest) ratio of current price to the J-month lowest price, and the 
middle portfolio contains the remaining stocks. ROAs are reported starting in year -2 which is 
two years before the start ofthe formation period, which is indicated by year 0. Reported on the 
left-hand side is the mean of ROAs in the three portfolios, and the median of ROAs are showed 
on the right-hand side. The sample period is from January 1973 to December 1990. 
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For the explanation ofthe momentum effect recorded in the previous chapters, we 
can also find clues from the graphic evidence for movement of the ROAs. Recall the 
changes of stock retums depicted in Figure 2.1, it shows that the winner portfolio 
continuously outperforms the loser portfolio for almost 24 months after the formation. 
From the graphic evidence of changes in ROAs, we find that for most of the cases 
ROAs of winner portfolios continuously increase for at least one period after the 
formation period and then go decrease for the later periods. Reversely, the ROAs ofthe 
loser portfolios keep decreasing after the formation period for at least one more period, 
and then go increase for the rest of the holding periods. The extension of the trend in 
ROAs after the formation period can help to explain why the persistence of retums of 
tourism stocks can lasts for more than one year. Under the line of investor overreaction, 
the story is like that: during the second year of holding periods, viewing the historical 
movements ofROAs, investors find that the increase of winners stocks and the decrease 
of losers still continue and deem that such trends are permanent. Investors then long 
winners stocks and short losers stocks, resulting the momentum effect. Later, when 
ROAs decrease finally, the investors adjust their expectation and reversal effect occurs. 
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7.2 USING LOGIT MODEL TO EXPLORE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 
WlNNERAND THE LOSER PORTFOLIO 
In previous sections, evidences show that momentum and reversal effect in the portfolio 
performance are paralleled by movements in profits. In this section I reverse the 
direction of the investigation by exploring whether it is possible to use the movements 
in profits to distinguish between winner and loser stocks. By using a logit model which 
sorts stocks into the winner and the loser portfolio according to their performance in 
terms of fundamentals, such as changes in ROA, Cash Flow, Asset, I determine the 
probability that given a set of fundamental variables an observation belongs to the 
winner or to the loser portfolio. The analysis is pursued separately for the formation and 
for the holding period. For the formation period, it is expected that increases in profits 
should make it more likely that a stock belongs to the winner portfolio. For the test 
period the opposite result holds. 
The rest of the section is proceeding as follows. Firstly, I introduce the binary 
choice approach I use to conduct the exploration. Then I present regression results for 
both the formation and holding period to see whether stocks can be classified as winner 
or loser portfolios by using performance in fundamentals. 
7.2.1 INDUCTION OF A BlNARY CHOICE APPROACH- LOGIT REGRESSION MODEL 
The goal ofthis section is to predict the odds of the binary event's occurrence (whether 
a portfolio be a winner or loser) by using logistic regression. Although the probability of 
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winner/loser event could be directly modeled through ordinary linear probability 
regression, such methods, for example, the linear regression on the dichotomous [0,1] 
dependent variable, suffers from implausible predictions outside the 0,1 bounds for 
probability, particularly if the independent variable is continuous. In additional, the 
typical assumptions of homoscedasticity and normality of errors from the ordinary 
linear regression model are violated when the outcome is dichotomous, calling the 
validity ofresults from such an approach into question. In order to parry this problem, I 
adopted logistic regression in the following section, which models the odds, or more 
specifically, which model the natural log of the odds, referred to as the logit of a 
distribution, to conduct prediction. 
The odds for an event is a quotient that conveniently compares the probability that 
an event occurs (a portfolio be a winner, scored as Y= 1 in this case) to the probability 
that it does not occur (a portfolio be a loser, or the complement ofwinner, Y= 0), as 
P(Y=l) P(F=1) 
修 制 = 1 3 ^ ^ 
When the probability of winner is greater than the probability of loser, the odds are 
greater than 1.0; i f the two outcomes are equally likely, the odds, are 1.0; and i f the 
probability ofwinner is less than the probability ofloser, the odds are less than 1.0. 
To examine the impact on the odds of an independent variable, such as ROA or CE, 
I construct the odds ratio (OR) to compare the odds for different values of the 
explanatory variables. For example, if we want to compare the odds of being a winner 
portfolio between increased ROA (coded ret_ROA > 0) and decreased ROA (coded 
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ret_ROA < 0), we compute 




Odds ratio is a measure of association between the binary outcome and an 
independent variable that provides a clear indication of how the risk of the outcome 
being present changes with the variable in question. However, it is noted that OR are 
bounded below by 0 but have no upper bound, with a value of 1.0 indicating the null 
case of no change in the odds; that is, OR is nonlinear in parameters so that the effects 
of explanatory variables are not additive and this is obviously an undesirable 
characteristic. In order to eliminate the boundary problems (it is pointed out that the 
same situation occurs to probability), we model the natural log ofthe odds, as 
( p ( Y= A � 
HOdds) = logJt[F(f)] = ln^Y37^^ 
Here the logit ranges from negative infinity to infinity, which eliminates the skewness 
inherent in estimates of OR and probability. Furthermore, the transformed model is 
linear in the parameters, which means that the effects of explanatory variables on the 
log ofthe odds are additive. Thus, the logit model is much more convenience to work 
with and allows for interpretation of variable effects that are exceptionally 
straightforward, and for model-building strategies that mirror those of ordinary linear 
regression. 
In the case that more than one independent variable exists, I define 
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7r(v=lX,,X,,,.. ,X^)= ;z-(X) r i . 1 . . „ . 
V P) as the probability of "portfolio being a winner, for a 
given set of p independent variables and Y' as the odds in the transformed outcome 
variable, then the logistic model becomes 
/ . 、 \ 
ln(F) = log/%(X)] = l n ^ Y ^ ^ ^ 
= a — p^X\ — ^ L . + PpX; 
where a is a constant and pj is coefficient for predictors Xj {j 二 1,2, ..., p). 
The model describes the process of "linking" the original Y to the transformed 
/ ( j ) = ln(y) = l n [ 7 ^ ^ ] . ^ 1 
outcome U 一 ^ W ) . Solving for ;<X) gives us the expression for the 
logistic regression model for the probability ofawinner portfolio: 
/ � ^ 1 
• ) = T 7 Z = T 7 7 ^ 
Because the logistic model is developed through a nonlinear transformation of the 
outcome, its error terms do not exhibit a normal distribution and it cannot be estimated 
by ordinary least squares method. In statistical packages such as SAS，the intercept and 
regression weights for the variables are estimated by maximum likelihood methods. The 
likelihood represents the probability that the observed outcomes can be predicted from 
the set of independent variables and can be written as 
T ^ � z T " � z T""v 
: = • T T ^ J f - T ^ J , 
p ^ ( ^ ) 
^nL = T y r A n j ^ + (1 -J^)ln^l - ^ ^ ^ J . 
where the likelihood L can vary between 0 and 1 and the log-likelihood lnZ varies from 
negative infinity to 0. 
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The optimized solution ofthe function can be found by setting its first-order differential 
to zero, as 
射 ( 乃 命 。 
A- is the value ofthe logistic function for x,. The maximum likelihood estimation is used 
for estimating coefficients. 
In order to assess how well a fitted model reproduces the observed data, the 
deviance is calculated by comparing the likelihood ofthe fitted model to a model with a 
perfect fit. The likelihood of the perfect model is 1.0 and it has -21nZ = 0 (here \x\L is 
multiplied by -2 so that it creates a quantity that can be used for hypothesis testing). The 
"deviance" of any model is thus the quantity -21nZ. In SAS, the deviance Dm can be 
tested using the Deviance y^ criteria. However, it should be pointed out it is not 
appropriate when continuous explanatory variables are included. Under such cases, 
alternative methods for assessing model fit should be considered such as 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test. The H-L test forms several (g) groups referred to as “deciles of 
risk" based on the estimated probabilities for the sample. The cases within these deciles 
are then used to create a gx2 table of observed to expected frequencies, and a Pearson 
/ statistic is calculated for this table. If the model fits well, agreement is expected 
between the observed and expected frequencies, so that the null hypothesis o f a good fit 
between observed and expected frequencies from the model would be retained. 
In the estimated model, the associations between explanatory variables and the outcome 
are represented by ORs，distance from 1.0, in both positive and negative directions. For 
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a unit change in the independent variable, the corresponding OR is the factor by which 
the odds of “winner” are expected to change, controlling for all other independent 
variables in the model. Statistical significance ofan OR typically is assessed by testing 
if the regression coefficient is statistically different from zero through one of three 
approaches: a Wald, score, or likelihood ratio test. In the following model tests, all these 
parameters are reported. 
7.2.2 MODELI： USING CHANGES IN R O A 
From the observation of last section, it is intuitive to consider changes in ROA 
(calculated by R O A � - ROA_2/ROA_2, where ROAo denotes the ROA observed at the 
end of formation period and ROA.2denotes the ROA observed at two years ahead the 
beginning of formation period), which is named ret_ROA in the flowing section as 
independent variable in the logistic regression. In this model, 7 i s coded 1 for a winner 
portfolio, and 0 if not. The explanatory variable, ret—ROA, is coded according to its 
original value, so the independent variable in this model is continuous. Selected output 
from fitting this model is shown in the following table: 
Analysis ofMaximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald;^：^* p-value 
Intercept -0.0516 0.0428 1.4512 0.2283 
Ret—ROA -0.00210 0.0017 1.5216 0.2162 
R^= 0.00U Nagelkerke R^ = 0.0014 
112 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept only Intercept and covariates 
-21nZ 3030.541 3028.189 
Global Null Hypothesis Test: Ho： p 二 0 
Testing method i p-waluQ 
LikelihoodRatio 2.3518 0.1251 
Score 1.9776 0.1596 
Wald* 1.5296 0.2126 ^ 
* Wald statistics can be problematic when the independent variable is continuous rather 
than categorical. It is listed in the table for reference. 
It can be concluded that the continuous ret_ROA model failed to estimate the logit 
ofY. Thus there is no linear relationship between ret_ROA and logitY: a unit increase or 
decrease ofret—ROA has no predictable impact on the change in the logitY or the odds 
of being a winner portfolio. Recalling in the observation of previous section, it is the 
trend (increase or decrease) ofret—ROA, instead of the quantity of this trend, that might 
be related to the portfolio's performance, I decided to transform the original data into a 
discrete form. 
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7.2.3 MODELII： USING CODED RET_ROA 
In this model, I coded the ret_ROA to c_ROA: portfolios with ret_ROA value higher 
than 0.2 were coded as "c_ROA 二 1”，those with ret—ROA value lower than -0.2 were 
coded as "c_ROA 二 -1”，and all the others were coded as "c_ROA 二 0”. By doing this, 
the independent variable is transformed from a continuous into a discrete one. 
Coded ret—ROA 
c—ROA Corresponding ret—ROA Description 
1 ret ROA >= 0.2 ret_ROA increased in the period 
0 0.2 > ret_ROA >= -0.2 ret_ROA decreased in the period 
-1 ret ROA < -0.2 ret—ROA was not changed in the period 
The estimation results for this model are presented in the following table. It can be 
seen that a statistically significant decrease in the -21nZ is obtained when ret_ROA is 
replaced by c—ROA in the model. This reduction represents a proportionate reduction in 
deviance that can be expressed through the likelihood ratio i?\ : 1 - Dn/Do 二 .0558. The 
inclusion ofc_ROA in the model reduces the deviance of the null model (Do = -21nZ) by 
5.58%. 
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Analysis ofMaximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald;|^ ” a l u e 
Intercept 0.0877 0.0477 3.8599 0.0495 
Ret_ROA 0.6471 0.0510 160.6846 <0.0001 
R2= 0.0745 Nagelkerke R^ = 0.0994 
Model Fit Statistics 
Intercept only Intercept and covariates 
_21nZ 3030.541 2861.150 
Global Null Hypothesis Test: Ho： p 二 0 
Testing method / p-value 
Likelihood Ratio 169.3921 <0.0001 
Score 166.4673 <0.0001 
Wald 160.6846 <0.0001 
To further consider the ability of the model to correctly classify winner/loser 
portfolios, classification is based on the probabilities estimated from the model, and the 
results are compared with the observed frequencies for winner and loser categories. For 
any portfolio, it the estimated probability of "winner" based on the logistic model is 
greater than 0.5, the stock is attributed to the winner portfolio; or else the stock would 
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be loser portfolio. In the left hand side of classification table shows the matching 
frequencies. The elements on the main diagonal show the number of correct matches. 
Winner stocks are correctly sorted into winner portfolio, loser firms are correctly sorted 
into the loser portfolio. The failures to match are reported in the offdiagonal. 
In the empirical investigation I also present the estimation results in the right hand 
side ofthe table: the obtained model is used to separate winner/loser portfolio in the test 
period, which is the time period of 36 months next to the formation period. It is shown 
that, based on the explanatory variable c—ROA alone, a matching of 57.11% is obtained 
which is hardly more than 50% as is obtained from random matching. Interestingly, the 
result for the winner firms (67.19%) is substantially better as compared to the loser 
portfolio (44.93%). This can be explained by the observed data that are unbalanced in 
terms ofdistribution offrequency of the outcome. 
Classification Results 
Formation Period Prediction Period 
winner loser winner loser 
winner 818 302 600 293 
73.04% 67.19% 
loser 456 611 407 332 
57.26% 44.93% 
match 65.30% 57.11% 
1 
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7.2.4 MODELIII： MULTI-VARIABLE LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
2 
Although the model-fit test is statistically significant, I noticed that none of the R 
statistics is very large (up to 0.0994), suggesting that other explanatory variables in 
addition to c—ROA may be helpful in understanding the likelihood ofastock being in a 
winner portfolio or not. In the next step, I included following fundamental variables in 
the logistic regression: the changes in Asset (ret—A), the changes in Book Equity 
(ret_BE), the changes in Earnings (ret_E), the changes in Cash Flow (ret—CF), the 
changes in Sales (ret—S), the changes in Return on Equity (ret_ROE), and their coded 
counterpart: c_A, c_BE, c_E, c_CF, c_S and c_ROE . All those variables are calculated 
in the same way as ret_ROA. 
On the one hand, some ofthe variables are not significant to explain the change of 
logitY, on the other hand, not all the variables are independent to each other, which 
means interaction effects exist between variable. The following table lists only 
significant models and their performances: 
Explanatory variables R^ Nagelkerke R^ Dm(-21nZ) 
c_ROA, c_A 0.0788 0.1051 2851.062 
c_ROA, c_BE 0.0889 0.1186 2826.856 
c_ROA, c_CF 0.0935 0.1246 2815.961 
c ROA c S 0.0768 0.1024 2855.855 __ ， — 
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Among these models, c—ROA, c—CF model is selected as independent variables. The 
classification results are re-built as follows: 
Classification Results 
Formation Period Prediction Period 
winner loser winner loscr 
• oia 307 597 296 winner oi3 Ju/ ^ y 
72.69% 66.85% 
loser 446 621 395 344 
58.20% 46.55% 
match 65.60% 57.66% 
In each model, the matching difference between formation period and prediction 
period does not come as a surprise i fwe think ofthe research design ofthe winner-loser 
effect. During the formation period stocks are sorted according to their realized retums. 
This implies that we can increase the explanatory power of the probit analysis up to a 
level of 100% ifwe use retums instead of c—ROA. We can think of c_ROA to proxy for 
this development in returns. However, for the test period such a benchmark is not 
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available. Therefore, The classification results for the test period have tumed out to be 
considerably weaker than the results for the formation period. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE PRICE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS TO 
TOURISM STOCKS 
In previous chapters, I investigate whether tourism stocks have momentum and reversal 
effects. Besides documenting significant evidences ofboth the effects for three trading 
strategies, I gave out two possible explanations: one is in the framework of rational 
asset pricing and the other one is based on hypothesis ofirrational investment behavior. 
Both explanations can explain the recorded anomalous phenomena for certain extents. 
In this chapter I further explore another interesting phenomenon appears in retums of 
tourism stock and propose possible explanation about it. 
Recall table 4.1 in chapter 4, where portfolio retums of three trading strategies have 
been reported. Besides recording significant difference between retums ofwinner and 
loser portfolios, it also shows variation of stock retums for different subsample period: 
portfolio retums of the first subsample period, 1973-1990, are always larger than 
corresponding portfolio retums of the second subsample period, 1991-2008. For 
example, for the JT(12,6) strategy in panel A，retums of the sell and buy portfolios for 
1973-1990 are 1.07% and 1.81% respectively, whereas retums of the sell and buy 
portfolios for the same strategy for 1991-2008 are 0.09% and 1.09% respectively. Such 
phenomenon is not unique to portfolios formed based on strategy JT. A closer look 
reveals that portfolios for 1973-1990 outperforms their counterparts for 1991-2008 in 
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almost every strategies in panel B and panel C, which record results of strategy GHH 
and strategy GHL respectively. Moreover, such effects are not limited to winner and 
loser portfolios. Reviewing results oftable 4.2, we can find that for middle portfolios, 
the retums in the first half sample period are also larger than the ones in the second half 
sample period. Then, all the evidences point to the same conclusion that tourism stocks 
do better in the period 1973-1990 than they do in 1991-2008 by yielding higher retums. 
Thus there comes to the question whether such phenomenon is unique to the 
tourism stocks or is pervasive to the general stock market. By reviewing results ofthe 
general market from table 5.1, we can find that retums ofloser and winner portfolios for 
the first subsample period and the second subsample period are almost in the same level. 
For example, for the JT(6,6) strategy again, retums of the loser and winner portfolio for 
the first subsample period, 1973-1990, are 1.10% and 1.70% respectively, and the 
retums ofthe loser and winner portfolio for the second subsample period, 1991-2008 
are 1.28% and 1.37%. This implies that the retum difference between period 1973-1990 
and 1991-2008 is unique to the tourism industry. 
Why retums oftourism stocks in 1973-1990 are significantly greater than the ones 
in 1990-2008? In this chapter, I propose an explanation related to the increase of 
institutional ownership in tourism stock as a possible reason. The rest of the chapter 
then proceeds as follows. Firstly, I present evidence of the increment in institutional 
ownership in tourism stocks and its implication on stock retums. Then I show regression 
results on how changes of institutional ownership influence stock retums. 
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8.1 CHANGES OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP IN TOURISM SXOCKS 
For this study, institutional holdings data (number of shares held by institutional 
investors in each quarter for each company) is from Spectrum 3-13 (f) Institutional 
Stock Holdings Survey, provided by Computer Directions Advisors (CDA) Investment 
Technologies, Inc., a service company engaged by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to process and maintain 13(f) filings. According to the rules ofSEC, 
only institutional managers exercising investment discretion over $100 million in equity 
securities are required to file the holding information. Thus the data set used here can 
not cover all institutional ownership in the real market. We can only proxy extent of 
institutional ownership relatively rather than absolutely. For each stock, the institutional 
ownership is measured by percentage of outstanding stocks held by institutional 
investors (number ofshares held by institutional investor divided by shares outstanding). 
The sample period is from 1981 to 2008, where 1981 is the earliest year when 
information is available from the database. 
Table 8.1 presents changes of institutional ownership for tourism stocks from 1981 
to 2008. It shows that the number of tourism stocks listed is monotonically increasing 
from 1981 to 1999 in most of the years and then decrease during 2000 to 2008. This 
suggests that the U.S. stock market boom in the 1990s occurs in the tourism industries 
too and then tourism industries suffer from difficulties due to the U.S. economic 
regression in the past ten years. Institutional holdings (shares held by institutional 
investors divided by shares outstanding) also register a marked increase from 8% in 
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1981 to 23% in 1994 and then from 22% in 1995 to 64% in 2008. Chan, Leung and 
Wang (2003) study the impact ofinstitutional investors on Monday effect and they also 
report that the percentage ofinstitutional investors is basically monotonically increasing 
from 1981 to 1999 for the general market. Besides, the distribution of institutional 
holdings among different sectors in the industry is quite even. 
This marked increase in institutional holdings may be beneficial to all shareholders 
of the firms because institutional investors tend to be more active shareholders. The 
activism of institutional shareholders helps reduce agency costs because they closely 
monitor the performance of corporate management. Smith (1996) documents that 
CalPERS (California Public Employees’ Retirement System) targeted 51 firms between 
1983 and 1993, 72 percent ofthe targeted companies after 1988 settle with CalPERS by 
adopting proposed changes or making changes. Firms that adopt or settle have an 
increase in shareholder wealth and those that resist have a decrease. By attracting more 
institutional investors, tourism stocks could also benefit from an increase in shareholder 
wealth documented above. Institutional investors also bring more funding for existing 
operation and expansions because they are capable of buying large amounts of bonds 
and stocks issued by companies. Moreover, institutional investors play important roles 
in debt financing. Elgonemy (2002) reports that insurance-company financing is an 
important source ofdebt financing in the lodging industry. 
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Table 8.1 Institutional Percentages for Tourism Stocks 
Institutional percentages are equal to shares held by institutional investors for each stock in the 
second quarter of each year divided by shares outstanding on the last day of June for the 
corresponding stock in each year. Shares held by institutional investors are from Spectrum files 
and shares outstanding are from CRSR 
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Besides all the mentioned advantages brought by institutional investors, more 
important to the stock market, institutional investors would bring more liquidity to the 
stock market. With this increase in liquidity, investors may face less risk in investing in 
stocks. In a framework ofrational asset pricing, stock retum is compensated by risks the 
stock bare. If a stock faces less risk than other stocks do, it should eam fewer retums 
according to the theory. This is why market premium should always be larger than the 
risk-free interest rate in the Black CAPM model. Furthermore, institutional investors are 
always considered more experienced and sophisticated than individual investors and 
tend to behave more rationally and over-react less. Thus, stocks with higher institutional 
ownership should adjust to fundamental changes more quickly and better reflect the 
fundamental information of the companies than stocks with lower institutional 
ownership. 
Therefore, I propose the increment of institutional ownership in tourism stocks as a 
possible explanation of the difference between stock retums of the first and second 
subsample periods for the following two reasons. Firstly, because of the increased 
liquidity brought by institutional investors, stocks face less risk in the second subsample 
period than they do in the first subsample period. Then according to the rational asset 
pricing model, stocks should eam fewer returns in the second subsample period than 
they do in the first-half sample period. Secondly, the increase of the institutional 
ownership in tourism stocks induces higher capability of tourism stocks to adjust to and 
reflect their fundamental values. As tourism industry suffers more in the second-half 
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sample period than the first-half sample period, stock retums of the second-half sample 
period are considerably lower than the ones of the first-half sample period. Then the 
increase of institutional ownership act as a catalyst to let stock retums better and more 
truly reflect the fundamental information. In line of the above reasoning, I make the 
following hypothesis: 
Given other factors unchanged, levels ofinstitutional ownership are negatively related 
to stock returns. Stocks with higher level of institutional ownership would have lower 
returns; stocks with lower level ofinstitutional ownership would have higher returns. 
8.2 Regression Results 
To study the direct relationship between return and institutional holdings, we run 
regression using current year return as the dependent variable. Table 8.2 presents results 
from the regressions. 
In PanelAthe independent variables are previous year institutional holding, current 
year ROA, previous year retum, the logarithm of the market capitalization of the stock 
on the last day ofJune ofeach year and dummies for Airlines stocks (equal 1 ifequal to 
Airlines stock and 0 otherwise), Eating Places stocks (equal 1 if equal to Eating Places 
stock and 0 otherwise) and Hotel stocks (equal 1 if equal to Hotel stocks and 0 
otherwise, Amusement Park stocks are set to the base here)�We run the regression for 
the whole sample period, 1981-2008, the first-half, 1981-1994, and the second-half, 
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1995-2008. The coefficients for institutional holding in all three periods are negative, 
providing support that higher previous year institutional holdings have negative effects 
on the current year retums. The coefficients for the whole and sub-periods are all very 
statistically significant that the null hypothesis- coefficients equal zero, can be rejected 
with more than 99% confidence. Stock retums also show great positive relationship 
with scales of market equity. It seems that the larger the company size the higher the 
stock retums a company would eam. This observation conflict the pervasive experience 
in the general stock market that stock retums are negative related to the company sizes. 
For other explanatory variables, current year ROA and previous year retums, it shows 
that current retum have positive relation with current year ROA and negative 
relationship with previous year retum. However, such relationships are not statistically 
significant. For retum differences among various tourism sectors, we do not fmd 
significant retum spreads among them. 
In Panel B, C and D, we further divide the stocks in each sector into three portfolios 
according to the three trading strategies used in previous chapters. Panel B presents 
results of strategy JT where portfolios are formed based previous year retum. It shows 
that all coefficients for the previous year institutional holding are negative. The 
coefficients ofwinner portfolios are very significant for all the sample periods, the ones 
of middle portfolios are more significant in the second-half sample period that the 
first-half sample period, yet the ones of loser portfolios are not very significant. This 
result suggests that for stocks performing well in the previous year, they will continue to 
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have a higher return if they have lower institutional investors in the previous year. In 
terms of coefficients of log of market capitalization, winner and loser portfolios show 
very different results. For the winner portfolios, stock retums and the company sizes 
show negative relationship, yet for the loser portfolios, they show positive relationship. 
For other independent variables, most ofthe coefficients are not very significant. 
Panel C and D present result of strategy GHH and GHL where portfolios are 
formed based on previous price level. In Panel C, all the coefficients ofprevious year 
institutional holding are negative and eight ofthe nine coefficients are highly significant. 
For coefficients of log of market capitalization, it shows that only the ones of loser 
portfolios are positively related to the stock retums and with high significant levels, 
coefficients ofother portfolios are not significantly different zero. For coefficients ofall 
the other independent variables, most ofthem are not significantly different from zero. 
For Panel D，all the coefficients ofprevious year institutional holding are negative and 
six of the nine coefficients are highly significant. For coefficients of log of market 
capitalization, it shows that seven ofnine coefficients are positively significant different 
zero. For coefficients of all the other independent variables, most of them are not 
significantly different from zero. 
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Table 8.2 Regression Results 
Dependent variable is current year retum. The independent variables for Panel A are previous 
year institutional holding, current year ROA, previous year return, dummies for Amusement 
Park stocks (equal 1 ifequal to Amusement Park stock and 0 otherwise), Eating Places stocks 
(equal 1 if equal to Eating Places stock and 0 otherwise) and Hotel stocks (equal 1 if equal to 
Hotel stocks and 0 otherwise, Airline stocks are set to the base here) and the logarithm ofthe 
market capitalization of the stock on the last day of June of each year. In Panel B, we further 
divide the stocks in each sector into three portfolios according to their previous year retum. In 
Panel C (D), stocks in each sector are divided into three portfolios according to the ratio of 
current price to the highest (lowest) price achieved within the previous 12 months. 
Panel A.By Different Periods 
Institutional Cun.ent Previous Logof Eating Hotel ^ ° ' ° ^ Adjusted 
PeHod Intercept _ i n g yearRQA y e a i . _ n ME ^ " ' " " E _ g , ^ s R2 
1981-2008 0.088 -0.298 0.016 -0.006 0.029 -0.005 -0.028 -0.030 ^726 0.013 
(t-stat) 1.56 -7.46*** 0.20 -0.25 4.09*** -0.10 -0.61 -0.58 
1981-1994 ^ ^ 0 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 0.009 " ^ 1 0.005 
(t-stat) 1.12 -3.34*** 0.30 -0.20 1.71* 0.38 0 . 4 2 _ O J J 
1995-2008 0.053 -0.288 0.011 -0.008 0.036 -0.027 -0.060 -0.058 ^^^^ o.019 
(t-stat) 0.74 -5.68*** 0.08 -0.26 4 . 3 4 _ -0.39 -1.11 -0.91 . 
Panel B: By Different Periods andDifferent RankingLevels (Strategy JT) 
Winner 1.219 -0.430 -0.476 -0.046 -0.050 -0.061 -0.187 -0.111 ^^4 0.080 
(t-stat) 9 87*** -5.84*** -2.15** -0.87 -3.15*** -0.63 -2.10** -1.15 
1981 Middle -0.034 -0.103 0.020 0.011 0.008 0.060 0.046 0.064 ^^^ 0.024 
• (t-stat) -1.08 -3.50*** 0.28 0.66 1.78* 2 . 1 0 " 1.81 2 . 1 5 " 
2008 Loser -0.551 -0.045 0.012 0.012 0.024 0.040 0.092 0.129 $48 0.049 
(t-stat) -14.93*** -1.22 0.06 0.67 3 . 7 1 * " 1.37 3.70*** 3 . 7 2 * " 
; ^ ^ ~ ~ l J ^ ^ : : ^ 1 ^ ~ ~ : ^ ^ 07l43 0.068 0.114 3^ 3 o.062 
(t-stat) 5 99*** -3.14*** -0.30 -0.15 -3.18*** 0.89 0.42 0.72 
1981 Middle 0.048 -0.027 -0.037 -0.011 0.007 -0.024 0.001 0.004 极 0.003 
. (t-stat) 0 79 -0.45 -0.29 -0.43 0.81 -0.43 0.03 0.06 
1994 Loser -0.473 -0.006 0.270 -0.006 0.027 -0.014 0.053 0.044 3^^ 0.075 
(t-stat) -8.80*** -0.07 1.98* -0.47 2.82** -0.24 1.06 0.74 
Winner 1.117 -0.471 -0.747 -0.069 -0.020 -0.081 -0.265 -0.165 ^^^ O.12O 
(t-stat) 7.98*** -5.00*** -2.95*** -1.48 - l .29 -0.67 -2.60** -1.42 
1995 Middle -0.090 -0.087 0.017 0.024 0.012 0.081 0.052 0.067 ^^^ 0 034 
_ (t-stat) -2.57** -2.51** 0.18 1.10 2.15** 2.30** 1.84* 1.82* 
2 麵 Loser -0.578 -0.006 0.005 0.034 0.022 0.027 0.074 0.139 ^^^ 。 膽 
(t-stat) -13.79*** -0.15 0.04 1.87* 2.88** 0.78 2.59 3.00 
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Panel C: By Different Periods andDifferent RankingLevels (Strategy GHH) . _ 
Winner 0 757 ^ 0 3 ^ I 5 j 6 6 ~ ~ - 0 . 0 3 9 ~ ~ - 0 . 0 1 4 ~ ~ - 0 . 1 2 6 " " " - 0 . 1 6 7 ~ ~ - 0 - 2 2 7 \^^^ 0 .042 
(t-stat) 6 95*** ' -5 .76*** -1.48 -0.53 -1 .09 -1 .52 -2 .11** -2 .82** 
1981 Middle 0 194 -0 131 -0 .326 -0 .074 -0 .008 0 .120 -0 .037 0 .004 ^007 0.035 
- (t-stat) 2 11** -2 .31** -1.63 -2 .44** -0 .80 1.35 -0.51 0.05 
2008 Loser -0 378 -0 .288 0 .006 0.035 0 .050 -0.011 0 .018 0 .084 34^ 0 .038 
( t - s t a O - 6 . 1 0 " * - 4 . 7 3 * * * O.OQ 1 12 4 . 7 4 * " - 0 . 1 8 _ ^ _ _ ^ 
Winner 0 5 5 5 " " " T ^ ^ ^ 1 -0 .043 ^ 8 0.131 0.165 0 .029 4gQ o.028 
(t-stat) 3 13*** -3 .05*** -0 .50 -0.33 -1.33 0.93 1.10 0.21 
1981 Middle 0 237 -0 073 -0 .183 -0 .056 -0 .016 0.031 -0 .076 0.025 ^^Q 0 .022 
- (t-stat) 2 10** -0.68 -0.53 -1 .71* -0.97 0.26 -0.83 0.25 
1994 Loser -0 285 -0 375 -0 .100 -0 .006 0 .080 -0 .229 -0 .095 -0 .086 34g o .058 
rt- .t .t^ -2 43** -2 .35** -0 .59 -0 .10 4 . 5 3 * " - 1 . 8 8 * _ _ ： 0 ^ ± ^ 
0 7 6 3 ~ ~ 1 ^ ~ ~ ^ ^ ~ ~ - 0 . 0 4 4 ~ ~ - 0 . 0 0 2 ^ ^ 3 -0 .289 -0 .288 593 o.085 
Tt-stat) 6 4 3 - * - 4 . 6 2 - * -1.57 -0.55 -0.13 -1.67 - 3 . 2 6 * * * - 3 . 1 6 * * * 
1995 Middle 0 182 -0 .185 -0 .346 -0 .103 -0 .003 0 .222 -0 .018 -0 .048 � 0 .054 
- (t_stat) 1 44 -2 .58** -1.13 -1 .91** -0.21 1.73* -0 .20 -0 .49 
2008 Loser -0 411 -0 195 0 .008 0.051 0 .039 0.043 0.005 0 .116 493 Q.037 
(t-stat) -5 .27*** -2 .81** 0.07 1.45 3 .05*** 0.56 O M ^ 3 
Panel D: By Different Periods andDifferent RankingLevels (Strategy GHL) 
Winner 0 . 5 3 0 " " "：0：^ OOM 0 ^ 6 ^ ~ ~ _ 0 . 0 6 6 ~ " - 0 . 0 0 6 ~ ~ - 0 . 0 6 1 ^ 3 o .022 
(t-stat) 4 39*** -5 .81*** 0.18 0.29 1.67 -0.63 -0 .06 -0.55 
1981 Mid<Ue -0 161 -0 .163 0.305 0 .004 0 .036 0 .046 0 .094 0 .047 丨。。？ o .056 
_ (t-stat)-3 59*** -4.00*** 2.05** 0.17 5.23*** 1.11 2.75** 1.21 
2008 Loser -0 371 -0.087 0.367 0.005 0.035 0 .002 0 .052 0.115 g41 0 .088 
(t-staO -9 70*** -1 .98** 4 .05*** 0.22 5 .68*** 0.06 1.61 2 , 7 ^ 
Winner 0 476 1^ 448 0^ 1s4 00^~~-0.007 0.136 0.231 0.217 4gQ 0.012 
(t-stat) 2 51** -2 .58** 0.94 0.03 -0.25 0.76 1.32 1.17 
1981 Middle -0 053 -0 .143 0 .382 -0 .023 0.043 -0 .054 -0 .033 -0 .079 ^^^ o .062 
_ (t-stat) -0 68 -1.60 0.96 -0 .50 3 .50*** -0.63 -0.43 -1 .02 
1994 Loser -0 314 -0 064 0.276 -0.001 0.049 -0.115 -0.010 -0.010 34g o.lOO 
(t-statV-4.59_ -0.59 1_48 -0.03 4.25_ - 1 . 5 3 _ _ ^ ^ ^ _ ^ _ 
: ; ^ J ^ ^ ~ ~ 5 7 7 ] I o 6 ^ 0 ； ^ 0 ； ^ 0 .056 -0 .107 -0 .093 -0 .216 593 o .042 
(t Stat) 3 05*** -5 15**** 0.08 0.28 2 .66** -0.79 -0 .82 -1 .59 
1995 Middk -0 223 -0.121 0 .237 0.018 0.035 0.033 0.135 0.073 � 0 .064 
- ( t - s t a t ) -3 .71_ -2.46- 1.51 0.79 3.95_ 0.62 3.47_ 1.38 
2008 Loser -0 390 -0 024 0.341 0.007 0.027 0 .019 0.053 0.163 493 o .098 
(t-stat) -8 .29*** -0.49 3 .52*** 0.27 3 .77*** 0.35 L f 5 _ _ 1 ： ^ ^ 
* Significant at the 10% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
** Significant at the 5% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
*** Significant at the 1% level for a two-tailed T-test. 
T-stat is the Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-stat 
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In conclusion, form the regression results, we confirm a strong negative 
relationship between stock retums and institutional holdings. It shows that on average 
one percent increase in institutional holdings can induce 0.3 basis point decrease in 
stock return. Thus given other factor unchanged, if the institutional holding increase by 
50 percent (the average increase on institutional holdings from 1981 to 2008 for tourism 
stocks), stock retums would decrease by 15 basis points. Though such spread can only 
explain a portion of the difference of stock retums between the first-half and the 
second-half subsample periods, we wish the reasoning of increased institutional holding 




The ruling paradigm in financial economics is that stock markets are efficient, and it 
should be impossible to predict future stock retums based on its historical retums. 
However, as more and more anomalous evidences accumulate, it shows that there exists 
certain intertemporal dependence in the cross section of stock prices. Among those 
findings, the effect of short-term price momentum and long-term price reversal caught 
more and more attention. Such effect depicts a phenomenon that stocks which have 
higher past retums (the "winner" stocks) continuously perform better than stocks which 
have lower past retums (the "loser" stocks) in the short-run (no more than one year) and 
tend to underperform “loser” stocks in the long-run. To interpret this phenomenon, on 
one hand, proponents ofefficient market hypothesis, such as Fama and French (1996)， 
try to explain the effect within the framework of rational pricing. On the other hand, 
scholars of financial behaviors tend to develop new models based on irrational 
investment behavior ofmarket participants to solve the anomalies. 
Though the momentum and reversal effect has been widely discussed in the U.S. 
general stock market, it has been rarely addressed in a specific industry. This study then 
contributes to the tourism literature in several ways. 1) It tries to cover more 
comprehensive groups oftourism stocks by including all stocks in eating and drinking 
places, hotels, amusement and recreation services and also scheduled air transportation 
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listed in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. 2) The study period is from 1973 to 2008, 
covering a long period and making sure that the analysis is not period specific. I also 
divide the total period into two sub-periods to study the possibility of structural change 
between the two sub-periods. 3) I compare the momentum and price reversal 
characteristics of the tourism stocks with that of the general market. This will put the 
analysis of tourism stocks in a proper context. 4) Institutional investors become 
increasingly important because it is an important source offunding for companies in its 
operation and expansion. Singh and Schmidgall (2000) study different types of 
financing sources for lodging properties. They find that institutional investors are 
important source of financing for luxury and upscale hotels. However, institutional 
investors are less important than banks in financing for midscale, economy, budget and 
extended-stay hotels. Institutional investors are also much more active than small 
investors in monitoring the corporate managements. The study will shed light on the 
impact of institutional investors on tourism stocks. 5) Momentum and price reversal 
effects are one of the most interesting seasonal anomalies documented in the fmance 
literature. I analyze this anomaly in the context of tourism stocks and compare the 
results with that ofthe general market. The similarities and differences between tourism 
stocks and the general market provide additional information about the characteristics of 
tourism stocks. This has strong implication for the management oftourism companies. 
In this study, the major objective is to reexamine the price momentum and reversal 
effect in the contents of tourism stocks (Airline, Hotel, Eating Places and Amusement 
133 
Parks listed in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ from 1973 to 2008) and give possible 
explanation in terms of rational pricing and irrational investment behavior. Another 
purpose of the study is to investigate an interesting phenomenon observed during my 
research on momentum and reversal effect. I find that portfolio retums oftourism stocks 
are much higher in the first-halfofthe past three decades than in the second-half. This is 
coupled with a substantial increase in shares held by institutional investors in the 1990s. 
I propose the marked increase in institutional holdings be one of the major factors 
behind the change ofretums. 
This paper uses three different trading strategies: strategy JT, GHH and GHL to 
explore the momentum and reversal effect. In strategy JT portfolios are formed based on 
cumulative compounded previous retums, and in strategy GHH(L) portfolios are formed 
based on ratios ofthe last price offormation period divided by the highest(lowest) price 
achieved in the formation period. 
To investigate the relationship between stock retums oftourism industry and overall 
stock market, I also explore the retum behavior ofU.S. stock market as a benchmark by 
using the three trading methods. Empirically, it show that though both the tourism 
industry and the general market show short-term price momentum and long-term price 
reversal, momentum effect for the tourism stocks is much more significant than the one 
ofthe general stock markets. It shows that the self-financing portfolios of the tourism 
industry eam significant positive profits till 24 months for the whole sample period, 
regardless the trading strategies. However, for the general stock market, the 
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self-financing portfolios can eam positive profits only within 12 months, and many of 
the profits are not very significant. On the other hand, the reversal effect for the general 
market seems to be stronger than the one of tourism industry, that the sell portfolio 
outperforms the buy portfolios for most strategies with holding length longer than 12 
months. Besides, self-financing portfolio oftourism industry is more profitable than the 
general market regardless the trading methods used. In terms of the seasonality, the 
tourism industry and the general stock market both show strong January effect in similar 
patterns. For the JT and GHH strategies, both ofthe winner and loser portfolios increase 
significantly in January and earn higher retums than the non-January months and the 
loser portfolio outperforms the winner portfolio in January with a very significant level. 
However, for the GHL strategy, though winner and loser portfolio do much better in 
January than in non-January months, the differences between winner and loser portfolio 
are not significant. 
For explanations of the momentum and reversal effect, I first try to interpret it 
within the framework of rational pricing by adopting the three-factor model of Fama 
and French (1993, 1996). From the result, I find that loser stocks for JT and GHH 
trading methods are tend to be smaller and relatively distressed which have positive 
SMB and HML slopes and higher future average retums. Conversely, winner stocks 
tend to be strong stocks that have negative slopes on HML and low future retums. In 
this line, the three-factor model can successfully explain the long-term reversal effect. 
However, it fails to explain the continuation of short-term retums, as stocks with low 
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past retums also load positively on HML and past winners load negatively on HML. 
Moreover, for portfolio retums of GHL strategy, the three-factor model seems not be 
able to predict even the long-term reversal effects, as there is no big difference for the 
loads on SMB and HML factors. 
Alternatively, I investigate whether the momentum and reversal effect can be 
explained by the irrational behavior of market participants. The starting point for my 
investigation is the hypothesis raised by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) that the 
reversal effect is due to an overreaction to current news. On one hand, for the winner 
portfolio, they observe an increase in fundamentals and believe that this increase is 
permanent. However, when the improvement turns out to be transitory, investors are 
surprised by the following deterioration in fundamentals during the holding period. 
Then, stock prices are adjusted accordingly, resulting in an underperformance ofwinner 
portfolio compared to the loser portfolio. On the other hand, for the loser portfolio the 
reverse pattern occurs. Empirically, I relate stock retums to movements in retum on 
asset (ROA). It tums out that the evidence is largely in line with the hypothesis that the 
movements in portfolio retums are paralleled by changes in ROAs. For the winner 
portfolio, the retum during the observation period is paralleled by an increase in profits. 
The subsequent underperformance during the holding period is paralleled by a decrease 
in fundamentals. For the loser portfolio, the reverse pattern is obtained. 
I further investigated whether one can use fundamental information such as ROAs 
to differentiate between the winner and the loser portfolio. Since portfolios have been 
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built conditional on past retums, it should be possible to use changes in fundamentals to 
imitate the selection process if the driving force of retums changes in fundamentals. 
Relying on only one fundamental as ROA, 65% of the stocks were sorted into the 
correct portfolios for the formation period. The discriminatory power of ROA is 
considerably weaker during the test period: the correct matching decreases to a level of 
57%. This finding hints towards an asymmetry between the formation and the 
subsequent test period. Due to the research design of the winner-loser effect for the 
formation period one investigates realized retums, whereas for the test period expected 
retums are investigated. The relationship between realized excess retums and realized 
ROAs is closer than for expected retums and expected ROAs. 
During my research on sub-period portfolio retums of tourism stocks, I found that 
portfolio retums of the first subsample period, 1973-1990, are always larger than 
corresponding portfolio returns ofthe second subsample period, 1991-2008. However, 
such phenomenon is not shown in the general stock market. This change coincides with 
a substantial increase in institutional holdings in hospitality stocks in the 1990s. I 
propose that the increase ofinstitutional ownership in tourism stocks may be one ofthe 
explanations behind the decrease of stock retums for two reasons. Firstly, because ofthe 
increased liquidity brought by institutional investors, stocks face less risk in the second 
subsample period than they do in the first subsample period. Then according to the 
rational asset pricing model, stocks should earn fewer retums in the second subsample 
period than they do in the first-half sample period. Secondly, the increase of the 
137 
institutional ownership in tourism stocks induces higher capability oftourism stocks to 
adjust to and reflect their fundamental values. As tourism industry suffers more in the 
second-half sample period than the first-half sample period, stock returns of the 
second-half sample period are considerably lower than the ones ofthe first-half sample 
period. Then the increase of institutional ownership act as a catalyst to let stock returns 
better and more truly reflect the fundamental information. The regression results 
confirm a strong negative relationship between stock retums and institutional holdings. 
It shows that on average one percent increase in institutional holdings can induce 0.3 
basis point decrease in stock retum. Thus given other factor unchanged, if the 
institutional holding increase by 50 percent (the average increase on institutional 
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